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INTRODUCTION
Bad things happen. Chemicals meant to lead to better living sometimes cause
cancer, reproductive problems, Parkinson’s disease, or other problems.1 Industrial plants and nuclear power plants designed to operate efficiently and safely
occasionally explode.2 Despite attempting to anticipate contingencies, offshore
drilling operations catastrophically fail in the face of the unexpected.3 Despite
our best efforts, infrastructure designed to protect communities collapses, inundating homes and businesses with floodwaters.4 Over the past forty years, businesses and governments have largely relied on the process of risk analysis (consisting of risk assessment and risk mitigation) to minimize the frequency and
magnitude of such events.5 In essence, risk analysis seeks to identify the likely
undesirable consequences associated with a given activity (risk assessment) and
develop measures to reduce those consequences to acceptable levels (risk mitigation).6 In practice, those risk mitigation measures attempt to control the source
of the risk by capturing emissions and pollutants, curbing flood waters, and containing biological agents. However, as technological failures and natural disasters mount, doubts have arisen about the value of this conventional approach to
risk analysis.7 Similar doubts also abound regarding the capacity of conventional
risk analysis to handle threats presented by conventional chemicals and newly
emerging materials.8
Why the loss of confidence in conventional risk analysis? Part of it stems
from the nature of risk assessment itself, at least as it is typically practiced. Risk
1

See WILLIAM L. BIRD, JR., “BETTER LIVING”: ADVERTISING, MEDIA, AND THE NEW
VOCABULARY OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP, 1935–1955, at 22–23 (1999) (tracing the history of
Dupont’s 1935 iconic slogan “Better Things for Better Living . . . through Chemistry”). The
slogan is perhaps better known today in its bastardized version: “Better living through chemistry.”
2
See Timothy F. Malloy, Of Natmats, Terrorists, and Toxics: Regulatory Adaptation in a
Changing World, 26 J. ENV’T L. 93, 99–101, 109 (2008) [hereinafter Malloy, Natmats].
3
See Robin Kundis Craig, Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1863, 1896 (2011).
4
See Susan L. Cutter et al., Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative, 55 ENV’T: SCI &
POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 25, 25–29 (2013).
5
See, e.g., J. Park et al., Integrating Risk and Resilience Approaches to Catastrophe Management in Engineering Systems, 33 RISK ANALYSIS 356, 358–59 (2013); William Boyd, Genealogies of Risk: Searching for Safety, 1930s–1970s, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 895, 903 (2012). See generally PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK (1998);
Terje Aven, Risk Assessment and Risk Management: Review of Recent Advances on Their
Foundation, 253 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RSCH. (2016).
6
See Gary E. Marchant & Yvonne A. Stevens, Resilience: A New Tool in the Risk Governance
Toolbox for Emerging Technologies, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 238 (2017) (describing risk
analysis as including risk assessment to estimate risks and risk management to reduce risks to
an acceptable level); Stan Kaplan, The Words of Risk Analysis, 17 RISK ANALYSIS 407, 415
(1997) (providing an overview of the general steps involved in risk analysis).
7
See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies & Alexis Jones, Fukushima’s Shadow, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1083, 1100 (2015); Craig, supra note 3, at 1869; Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO.
L.J. 901, 906 (2011).
8
Davies & Jones, supra note 7, at 1100.
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assessment works well enough when the threat in question and the consequences
that flow from that threat are pretty well understood, including the probability
that the threat will become reality. When those conditions are absent—for example, where there is ambiguity or even ignorance regarding the nature of the threat
or scope of the potential consequences—conventional risk assessment becomes
problematic. Ambiguity and ignorance often arise when the threatened subject is
part of a complex system, such as an ecosystem facing the introduction of a new
species created through synthetic biology9 or a coastal community staring down
an increasingly unpredictable hurricane season.10 Likewise, conventional risk
analysis works poorly when data is unavailable due to cost or methodological
challenges or when the human behavior being managed is indeterminate.
I will argue that conventional risk analysis—meaning risk analysis fixated
on control—should expand to systematically integrate two related principles.
The first is prevention. Conventional risk analysis mitigates the consequences of
risky behavior; prevention-based thinking seeks to avoid the risk altogether. Its
modern roots lie in public health and industrial hygiene.11 The prevention principle is widely embraced but rarely implemented in a systematic fashion.12 Even
as a smattering of prevention-based regulatory programs are implemented in the
United States and elsewhere,13 debate continues over the place of prevention in
conventional risk analysis.14 The legal literature rarely addresses prevention’s
relationship to risk analysis.15
The second principle is resilience, which can be loosely defined as the capacity to respond to whatever does come to pass.16 A resilient system absorbs a
disturbance while maintaining its most critical functions and more quickly returns to optimal operation (or adapts well to the new normal).17 While the concept of resilience has been around for centuries, in the twentieth century it took
on particular significance in engineering, ecology and the natural sciences,

9

See generally Joel P. Hewett et al., Human Health and Environmental Risks Posed by Synthetic Biology R&D for Energy Applications: A Literature Analysis, 21 J. ABSA INT’L 177
(2016).
10
See W. Neil Adger et al., Social-Ecological Resilience to Coastal Disasters, 309 SCIENCE
1036, 1036 (2005).
11
See discussion infra Section II.A.
12
Timothy F. Malloy, Principled Prevention, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 105, 109 (2014) [hereinafter
Malloy, Principled Prevention].
13
See CAL CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 5189.1 (2017) (California regulations regarding refinery process safety); CAL CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 69501 (2013) (California Safer Consumer Products
regulations); Commission Regulation 1907/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1 (chemicals directive for
the European Union).
14
In 2014, the Journal of Risk Research published a special issue on the substitution principle.
Ragnar Lofstedt, The Substitution Principle in Chemical Regulation: A Constructive Critique,
17 J. RISK RSCH. 543 (2014) and accompanying commentaries.
15
But see Malloy, Principled Prevention, supra note 12, at 111–17 (providing an overview
of prevention in law).
16
See discussion infra Section II.B.
17
See infra Table 5.
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medicine, and other disciplines.18 Resilience has also made substantial inroads
into the legal literature. Little of that work focuses explicitly on risk analysis,
however.19 At the risk of oversimplifying, the bulk of legal literature can be generally sorted into three broad categories:20 resilience as a design principle for
legal systems,21 resilience as applied to natural resource management,22 and
18

See Jack Ahern, From Fail-Safe to Safe-to-Fail: Sustainability and Resilience in the New
Urban World, 100 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 341, 341 (2011).
19
Examples of legal scholarship on the topic include Marchant & Stevens, supra note 6, at
244. See also Craig, supra note 3, at 1863.
20
The categories serve only as a rough organizational framework for a diverse set of articles.
There is of course leakage between them, and a fair number of other articles scattered across
other distinguishable topics. See, e.g., Shalanda H. Baker, Anti-Resilience: A Roadmap for
Transformational Justice within the Energy System, 54 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L.
REV. 1 (2019) (energy); Leigh Barton, Note, Let It Burn: An Argument for an Adaptive Resilience Approach to Federal Wildfire Management in the Western United States, 30 GEO. ENV’T
L. REV. 695 (2018) (wildfire); Pierre de Vries, The Resilience Principles: A Framework for
New ICT Governance, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 137 (2011) (information and communication technologies). Others engage with complexity theory and other resilience-related
themes without explicitly invoking the concept of resilience. See Sara Gosman, Planning for
Failure: Pipelines, Risk, and the Energy Revolution, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 349 (2020); J.B. Ruhl,
Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005);
Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J.
913 (2005). For a detailed overview of legal scholarship on resilience up to 2014, see TracyLynn Humby, Law and Resilience: Mapping the Literature, 4 SEATTLE J. ENV’T L. 85 (2014).
21
See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Letting Go of Stability: Resilience and Environmental Law,
94 IND. L.J. 689 (2019) (making the case for resilience as a guiding principle for environmental
law); Brian C. Chaffin et al., Transformative Environmental Governance, 41 ANN. REV. ENV’T
& RES. 399 (2016) (calling for new approach to environmental governance); Robin Kundis
Craig, Learning to Think About Complex Environmental Systems in Environmental and Natural Resource Law and Legal Scholarship: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 24 FORDHAM ENV’T
L. REV. 87, 87–88, 102 (2013) (arguing that complexity theory and resilience theory provide
strong theoretical foundations for environmental law and natural resources law); J.B. Ruhl,
Panarchy and the Law, 17 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 31 (2012) (applying panarchy theory to the
design of legal systems); J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive
Capacity in Legal Systems—With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1373 (2011) [hereinafter Ruhl, General Design] (designing legal instruments and institutions
to be resilient and adaptive); Donald T. Hornstein, Resiliency, Adaptation, and the Upsides of
Ex Post Lawmaking, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1549 (2011) (resiliency of legal systems). Scholars from
outside the legal academy have likewise addressed the linkage between law and resilience,
most notably the ecologist C.S. Holling. See C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience
and Adaptive Cycles, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND
NATURAL SYSTEMS 25 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
22
See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Trickster Law: Promoting Resilience and Adaptive Governance by Allowing Other Perspectives on Natural Resource Management, 9 ARIZ. J. ENV’T L.
& POL’Y 140, 142–43 (2019) (application of resilience thinking to natural resources management); Ahjond S. Garmestani et al., Can Law Foster Social-Ecological Resilience?, 18
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 37 (2013) (natural resource law and environmental policy); Robert W. Adler, Resilience, Restoration, and Sustainability: Revisiting the Fundamental Principles of the
Clean Water Act, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 139 (2010) (water quality and restoration); Mary
Jane Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of Adaptive Law and Ecological Resilience,
87 NEB. L. REV. 950 (2009) (ecosystem protection and restoration); Sandra Zellmer & Lance
Gunderson, Why Resilience May Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem
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resilience as applied to climate change mitigation and adaptation.23 Over the last
two decades, the peer-reviewed literature on risk analysis has begun to address
resilience,24 but the relationship of resilience to conventional risk analysis remains contested. Some commentators cast resilience as a supplement to conventional risk analysis or, in some cases, a replacement for it. 25 Many, but not all,
reserve resilience for the type of complex situations discussed above, relegating
other situations to conventional risk analysis.26
This Article will advance the legal and peer-reviewed literature in three
ways. First, it will provide an integrated framework for risk analysis by weaving
together principles of conventional risk analysis, prevention, and resilience. Today, the respective roles of the three are both confused and controversial. Confused in the sense that commentators often struggle to define the precise nature
and scope of prevention and resilience and their respective relationships to risk
analysis. Conventional risk analysis is clearly dominant, yet prevention and resilience already appear (albeit haphazardly) in various domains. Controversial in
that the respective debates about the relative usefulness of prevention and resilience rage on. This Article will view the three as integrated concepts that should
be used in concert to optimize the governance of threats. I will present a generalized framework for understanding the relationship among them and specifying
how prevention and resilience can address the limits of conventional risk analysis.
Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades, 87 NEB. L. REV. 893 (2009); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and Back Again, 7 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 59, 59, 61, 70–71 (2005) (natural resources management).
23
See, e.g., Peter Howard & Michael A. Livermore, Sociopolitical Feedbacks and Climate
Change, 43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 119, 126, 165–66, 169, 174 (2019); Kelley Pettus, Note, The
First American Climate Refugees and the Need for Proactive Relocation, 87 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 172, 190 (2019); Victor B. Flatt & Jeremy M. Tarr, Adaptation, Legal Resiliency, and
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: Managing Water Supply in a Climate-Altered World, 89
N.C. L. REV. 1499, 1499 (2011); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural
Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENV’T L. 363 (2010).
24
See generally Mary Warner et al., From Probabilistic Risk Analysis to Resilience with Network Science: Lessons from the Literature and Best Practice, in HANDBOOK ON RESILIENCE
OF SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS 99 (Matthias Ruth & Stefan Goessling-Reisemann eds., 2019);
IGOR LINKOV & BENJAMIN D. TRUMP, THE SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF RESILIENCE (2019);
Ortwin Renn & Andreas Klinke, Risk Governance and Resilience: New Approaches to Cope
with Uncertainty and Ambiguity, in RISK GOVERNANCE: THE ARTICULATION OF HAZARD,
POLITICS AND ECOLOGY 19–20 (Urbano Fra.Paleo ed., 2015); Riana Steen & Terje Aven, A
Risk Perspective Suitable for Resilience Engineering, 49 SAFETY SCI. 292 (2011). For early
discussions of resilience in the field of risk analysis, see ORTWIN RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE:
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 46 (2005); T. Aven & V. Kristensen, Perspectives on
Risk: Review and Discussion of the Basis for Establishing a Unified and Holistic Approach,
90 RELIABILITY ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY 1, 6 (2005); Denis Smith & Moira Fischbacher, The
Changing Nature of Risk and Risk Management: The Challenge of Borders, Uncertainty and
Resilience, 11 RISK MGMT. 1, 7–9 (2009).
25
See generally Terje Aven, The Call for a Shift from Risk to Resilience: What Does it Mean?,
39 RISK ANALYSIS 1196 (2019); Renn & Klinke, supra note 24, at 3, 21; Park et al., supra note
5, at 357 (distinguishing between risk assessment and resilience).
26
Renn & Klinke, supra note 24, at 2, 16.
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Second, this Article will move from the conceptual to the practical by answering the question of “how.” It will examine how the architecture of risk analysis—its structure, elements, and methodologies—must be changed so as to embrace prevention and resilience. Prevention and resilience inform aspects of risk
assessment and risk mitigation that conventional risk analysis tends to ignore or
assume away. To be sure, traces of prevention and resilience thinking exist in
risk analysis efforts. For instance, prevention in the form of bans of products or
processes sporadically occurs. Resilience in the shape of remediation or reclamation obligations occasionally surfaces. But there is much value to be gained
by bringing prevention and resilience to the forefront.
Third, this Article will take on the question of “when”—when should risk
managers rely upon the respective strategies of control, prevention, and/or resilience? In principle, one should select the optimal mix of strategies given the particular circumstances. Easier said than done. Comprehensive evaluation of diverse potential mitigation strategies can be costly (in terms of time and expense)
and highly uncertain. This Article will offer general principles for selecting the
optimal mix.
Following an overview of general risk analysis concepts, Part I will use three
case studies to illustrate how risk analysis functions “on the ground.” Building
off those scenarios, it examines several common situations in which conventional risk analysis can fall short, namely when critical data regarding risk is
missing, the natural or manmade system involved is complex, or there is significant indeterminacy regarding human behavior. Part II will turn to prevention
and resilience, offering brief histories of their origins and summaries of their underlying precepts. Part III then will map prevention and resilience onto the conventional risk analysis framework, highlighting how integration of the three can
resolve the problems of incomplete data, complexity, and indeterminacy. That
Part will also survey how prevention and resilience fit into the four major elements of risk analysis: problem formulation, risk assessment, evaluation of mitigation options, and implementation.
I.

RISK ANALYSIS: THEORY, PRACTICE AND LIMITATIONS

Risk analysis is a sophisticated and diverse discipline; its contours and details are beyond the reach of a single article. Thankfully, a granular view of risk
analysis is not needed to understand its limitations or its relationship to prevention and resilience. What follows is a distillation of the essential features of risk
analysis and an illustration of risk analysis as practiced in three brief case studies.
This Part concludes by assessing several critical limitations of conventional risk
analysis.
A. Risk Analysis Overview
Risk analysis is used in a variety of settings to assist in decision-making. In
some cases, as in the evaluation of new chemicals or the design and operation of
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industrial facilities, it is used to identify and minimize unintended consequences
of human activity. In others, it guides selection of measures to protect human
communities from natural disasters; think here about flood control efforts. Unsurprisingly, risk analysis takes different forms depending upon the setting; risk
analysis for nuclear power plant siting is decidedly different than that for new
pesticide registration, which itself differs markedly from risk analysis of potential flood events.
Despite differences across domains, risk analysis in each setting has several
common features. First, by definition, the focus is on risk. Risk is not simply a
number, curve, or probability function. Rather, risk is the integrated response to
three related questions: what can go wrong (threat)?, how likely is it to go wrong
(vulnerability)?, and what are the results if it goes wrong (consequences)?27 Although risk analysts frame this triplet of questions in diverse ways, all of these
varied formulations aim to answer those three questions.
First, the risk triplet informs the basic organizing frame depicted in Figure
1, used throughout this Article to examine the relationship between control, prevention, and resilience. As illustrated in Figure 1, the typical scenario requiring
risk analysis has three components: the thing or activity presenting the threat; the
vulnerable individual, entity, or system being threatened; and the damaged subject. The threatening agent interacts with the vulnerable subject, which leads to
adverse impacts upon the damaged subject.
FIGURE 1: THE RISK ANALYSIS FRAME

This frame can be used across a range of domains; Table 1 demonstrates its
application to pesticide use, industrial facilities, and synthetic biology. I explore
each of these scenarios in more detail below.

27

Kaplan, supra note 6, at 408; see also U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA/100/R-14/004, RISK
ASSESSMENT FORUM WHITE PAPER: PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS AND CASE
STUDIES 40 (2014); Yacov Y. Haimes, On the Definition of Vulnerabilities in Measuring Risks
to Infrastructures, 26 RISK ANALYSIS 293, 296 (2006).
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TABLE 1: RISK SCENARIOS
Threatening
Agent
Pesticide

Interaction

Terrorist

Truck Bomb

Refinery H2F
Tank

Synthetic Algae

Resource
Competition
Gene Transfer

Indigenous
Algae

Inhalation

Vulnerable
Subject
Farmworker

Impacts
Reproductive
Toxicity
Developmental Toxicity
Toxic Cloud
Release
Extinction
Ecosystem
Disruption

Damaged Subject
Farmworker
Farmworker’s
Child
Refinery
Workers
Nearby Residents
Indigenous Algae
Associated
Ecosystem

Second, while contemporary risk analysis approaches vary somewhat in
their details and vocabulary, risk analysis typically involves four primary elements: problem formulation, assessment, evaluation/selection of risk mitigation
measures, and implementation.28 Each of these elements consists of specific
functional components, as indicated in Table 2. For ease of presentation and analysis, the elements are typically displayed in a linear, stepwise fashion. As I discuss further in Part III, the process is actually much more iterative.29
TABLE 2: THE ARCHITECTURE OF RISK ANALYSIS
Elements
Problem Formulation
Assessment
Evaluation/Selection
Implementation

Functional Components
Problem definition
Identification of potential mitigation options
Risk assessment
Evaluation and selection of potential risk mitigation measures
Implementation of risk mitigation measures

While it goes by many names, problem formulation essentially serves a
screening and prioritization function, identifying the particular problem(s) or

28

See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SCIENCE AND DECISIONS: ADVANCING
RISK ASSESSMENT 11–13 (2009) [hereinafter NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SILVER BOOK]; THE
PRESIDENTIAL/CONG. COMM’N ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MGMT., FRAMEWORK FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT, at i (1997) [hereinafter PCCRARM]; Communication from the Commission on Consumer Health and Food Safety, at 19, COM (97) 183
final (Apr. 30, 1997). Some definitions of risk analysis also include other steps, such as risk
communication. See, e.g., id.
29
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SILVER BOOK, supra note 28, at 81; PCCRARM, supra note 28, at
48.
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risk(s) of concern for assessment.30 Consider the scenarios set out in Table 1
above. For any given scenario, there is a fair amount of flexibility in identifying
the relevant agents, subjects, and interactions. For example, the pesticide scenario above focuses on inhalation as the form of interaction, leaving out ingestion
of contaminated ground water or pesticide residues on foods as possible interactions. The focus on air exposure might be driven by the nature of the threatening
agent; some pesticide uses simply may not impact groundwater or leave residues
on crops. Alternatively, the agency responsible for the analysis may have a limited mandate; an air quality regulatory agency is unlikely to focus on groundwater implications.
Problem formulation also involves identifying potential mitigation options
for avoiding or minimizing the risk and associated adverse consequences.31 Ultimately, risk analysis is a comparative exercise; in the assessment phase, the
outcomes expected absent any intervention are typically compared to those occurring under a range of mitigation options. But which mitigation options are to
be included in that comparison? That question is answered during problem formulation, setting initial boundaries for the scope of the subsequent steps of risk
analysis.
Risk assessment picks up from there. Like problem formulation, risk assessment also means different things to different people, but generally speaking, it
refers to an analytical process for characterizing the nature, extent, and consequences of risk. Risk assessment typically includes four basic steps, as illustrated
in Figure 2: (1) identify the relevant threat, (2) assess the interaction between the
threat and the vulnerable subject, (3) evaluate the extent of vulnerability, and (4)
identify the potential consequences to the damaged subject.32 As noted above,
the risk assessment provides this information for the baseline scenario of no intervention and for the various mitigation option scenarios.

30

NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SILVER BOOK, supra note 28, at 73–74 (discussing problem formulation and scoping).
31
Id. at 11–12.
32
Id. at 11.
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FIGURE 2: RISK ASSESSMENT

A broad range of risk assessment methods exist, from qualitative to quantitative and from formal to informal. However, formal quantitative risk assessments generating numerical results tend to dominate in the literature and in prominent regulatory programs.33 Performing a risk assessment typically requires
specific training and expertise in a range of disciplines, although the particular
disciplines will vary by context. For example, human-health risk assessment for
chemical exposures may require, among other things, a toxicologist to assess
hazard and characterize the risk and an environmental engineer or industrial hygienist to assess exposure.34 Assessing the risks of explosion in a chemical plant
calls for a team with somewhat different skills, such as process engineers, safety
engineers, and operations personnel.35
The third step, evaluation of risk mitigation measures, faces an entirely different question than risk assessment: What should we do about the risk? As Figure 3 illustrates, in conventional risk analysis, risk mitigation focuses primarily
upon control options, meaning those that block or reduce the interaction between
the threatening agent and the vulnerable subject.36

33

See Boyd, supra note 5; Terje Aven, The Risk Concept—Historical and Recent Development Trends, 99 RELIABILITY ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY 33, 42 (2012); NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS.,
RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 18 (1983).
34
See Joel Tickner et al., Alternatives Assessment: New Ideas, Frameworks and Policies, 71
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 655, 655–56 (2017).
35
Paul Baybutt, Analytical Methods in Process Safety Management and System Safety Engineering – Process Hazard Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF LOSS PREVENTION ENGINEERING 501,
510–11 (Joel M. Haight ed., 2013); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119(e)(4) (2013).
36
Malloy, Principled Prevention, supra note 12, at 112–13; Cora R. Roelofs et al., Prevention
Strategies in Industrial Hygiene: A Critical Literature Review, 64 AIHA J. 62, 65–66 (2003).
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FIGURE 3: CONVENTIONAL RISK MITIGATION

Looking at Figure 3, it appears that there are other potentially fruitful points
for intervention. For example, why not intervene at the agent level, attempting to
reduce the threat it presents? Or perhaps focus on the subject, reducing its vulnerability? In theory, a comprehensive risk analysis would consider these other
points as well;37 in practice, conventional risk analysis typically does not. Accordingly, this summary concentrates on control; more on other strategies later.
Crafting a control strategy typically involves two elements. The first is deciding how much interaction between the threatening agent and the vulnerable
subject is acceptable. In many settings, this is done by specifying an acceptable
level of residual risk––that is, the level of risk that society is willing to take on.38
For example, when cleaning up a Superfund site, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) protects people from increased cancer risk over their lifetimes.39 Thus, a Superfund remediation is finished when exposure to the site presents an individual with a lifetime cancer risk of between one in ten thousand
and one in one million.40 In other settings, “safe enough” means applying an
acceptable level of effort to reduce risk, rather than articulating a specific risk
level.41 Examples of level-of-effort approaches include identifying best available
control technology to reduce air pollution42 or reducing risk “as low as
37

See RENN, supra note 24, at 41–44; PCCRARM, supra note 28, at 29–32.
See Paul R. Hunter & Lorna Fewtrell, Acceptable Risk, in WATER QUALITY: GUIDELINES,
STANDARDS AND HEALTH 207, 208–17 (Lorna Fewtrell & Jamie Bartram eds., 2001) (describing multiple approaches for defining “acceptable risk”).
39
Some readers may wonder why a Superfund cleanup would not be characterized as a repair,
rather than a control, strategy. A reasonable point, but if one views the Superfund site itself
(or the hazardous substances at it) as the threatening agent—as the underlying statute clearly
does—then many cleanups are fairly viewed as involving control.
40
40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(1,2) (2011). The federal Superfund program was established in 1980 to remediate sites at which hazardous substances have been released. See 42
U.S.C. § 9601. In any given case, the agency selects a specific acceptable risk within that
range. The agency uses other methods to set acceptable risk levels for noncarcinogens. 40
C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i).
41
As I illustrate in the pesticide case study below, in some cases, setting “safe enough” involves considering both risk and effort. Infra, Section I.B.1.
42
42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(b)(1), (d)(6), (g)(6)(A,B).
38
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reasonably practicable.”43 In most cases, the acceptable level of risk or effort is
then translated into an enforceable safety standard—the concentration of the hazardous substance left in the ground at the Superfund site or an air emission standard achievable using the best available technology, for example.
The second element of risk mitigation is choosing the means of attaining the
safety standard. The means fall into two general categories: engineering controls
and procedural controls.44 Engineering controls use physical means to meet the
safety standard, reducing or even completely barring interaction between the
threatening agent and the vulnerable subject. Think here of things like add-on
pollution control devices, such as baghouses, that capture particulate emissions;
treatment units that purify industrial wastewater before discharge to a stream; or
local area ventilation systems that suck toxic solvent vapors out of a workspace.
Procedural controls, also called administrative controls, block or minimize interaction by influencing the behavior of the vulnerable subject. Examples include
written standard operation procedures, checklists, and tagout protocols.45
B. The Case Studies
With this basic background in mind, I turn to three brief case studies to illustrate the varied forms that conventional risk analysis takes. The first case involves the registration of a new agricultural pesticide under California law, an
approval process that is quite similar to the federal EPA’s program. The second
case concerns industrial facility safety and the federal process safety management program. The third examines risk analysis of synthetic biology used to create microbes for biofuel production.
1. Pesticide Registration
We all face pests—insects, worms, weeds, and rodents—from time to time.
In agricultural operations, pesticides are a major tool for dealing with pests. A
pesticide is a substance or mixture “of substances intended for preventing,

43

Policy and Guidance on Reducing Risks as Low as Reasonably Practicable in Design, U.K.
HEALTH AND SAFETY EXEC., http://www.hse.gov.uk/managing/theory/alarp3.htm [perma.cc/
6ED2-W3S8] (June 17, 2003); see also Edwards v. Nat’l Coal Bd. [1949] 1 All ER 743 (CA).
44
See Bruce K. Lyon & Georgi Popov, Risk Treatment Strategies: Harmonizing the Hierarchy of Controls and Inherently Safer Design Concepts, 64 PRO. SAFETY 34, 40 (2019). In the
facility safety setting, engineering controls are broken into two categories: passive and active.
Passive controls act on demand without the need for activation. Examples include pressure
relief valves on a process unit that automatically release excess pressure to avoid an explosion.
Active controls, such as an explosion suppression system that injects inert materials into a
process to halt a reaction when a dangerous pressure increase is discovered, require detection
and activation. Paul Amyotte et al., Chemical Safety Board Investigation Reports and the Hierarchy of Controls: Round 2, 37 PROCESS SAFETY PROGRESS 459, 463–64 (2018).
45
Lyon & Popov, supra note 44, at 38, 41.
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destroying, repelling or mitigating any pest.”46 California has one of the most
stringent pesticide regulation programs in the United States. Before a pesticide
can be sold in California, its manufacturer must obtain approval—called “registration”—from California’s Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR).47 The
precise contours of the registration process are explicitly prescribed by several
statutes.48 Upon receiving a registration application, DPR staff scientists evaluate
the scientific data concerning the efficacy of the product and the potential human
health and environmental effects of its use. Drawing upon related federal rules,49
DPR regulations require manufacturers to submit toxicity testing data for a specified set of adverse effects, such as acute toxicity, mutagenicity, and reproductive
toxicity.50 If DPR concludes that the product may present significant adverse
health or environmental impacts, the agency must perform a risk assessment.51
On the basis of the risk assessment, DPR management considers potential
mitigation approaches that could be used to keep exposure to acceptable levels.
Typical mitigation requirements include buffer zones, limitations on the time or
volume of pesticide use, and use of personal protective equipment, such as
gloves, Tyvek clothing, or respirators. The mitigation measures are intended to
protect the health of agricultural workers and of other individuals who live, work,
or engage in activities nearby (sometimes called “bystanders”). If DPR management concludes that—taking into account the mitigation requirements—the pesticide meets the standards set out in the statute, it issues a proposed registration
decision for public comment. After considering public comment, DPR management makes a final registration decision. The final mitigation requirements are
issued as part of the approved label for the pesticide or in a separate regulation.52
2. Industrial Facility Safety
Shifts in the nature and course of environmental and safety regulations are
often traced to catastrophic events or shocking discoveries.53 Chemical safety at
46

CAL. DEP’T PESTICIDE REGUL., A GUIDE TO PESTICIDE REGULATION IN CALIFORNIA 22
(2017) [hereinafter DPR, GUIDE], www.cdpr.ca.gov/docs/pressrls/dprguide/dprguide.pdf [per
ma.cc/4A8Z-AAN5].
47
CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 12811 (West 1996).
48
Birth Defect Prevention Act of 1984, CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 13121–13135 (1984)
(addressing testing and registration); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21189.57 (West 2021)
(requiring analysis of potential alternatives and evaluation of cumulative impacts).
49
See 40 C.F.R. § 158.500 (2007) (setting out toxicology data requirements for federal registration).
50
FOOD & AGRIC. § 12824 (general requirement to evaluate safety); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3,
§ 6159 (2021) (incorporating federal toxicology data requirements for meeting Section 12824
evaluation requirement); FOOD & AGRIC. § 13123 (mandatory health effects testing).
51
FOOD & AGRIC. § 13134.
52
DPR GUIDE, supra note 46, at 54–55. DPR classifies pesticides of particular concern as
“restricted materials,” which are subject to heightened requirements. Id. at 28.
53
See generally David H. Sump, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Glance in the Rearview
Mirror, 85 TUL. L. REV. 1101 (2011) (recounting the impact of the Exxon Valdez spill on the
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industrial plants had its own paradigm-shifting moment with the Bhopal tragedy
in 1984, in which thousands died after an accident at the Union Carbide plant
sent a toxic cloud of methyl isocyanate over the sleeping city.54 Bhopal and other
notorious industrial accidents contributed to the passage of a range of industrialsafety regulatory programs, including the Occupational Health and Safety Administration’s (OSHA) process safety management (PSM) rule.55 OSHA’s PSM
program requires certain industrial facilities to evaluate hazards associated with
chemicals used in their processes and implement measures designed to minimize
the risks and mitigate the effects of chemical releases.56
Unlike our first case study involving pesticide registration, in implementing
its PSM rule, OSHA does not itself engage in risk analysis. Instead, the PSM rule
is a form of meta-regulation, or “management-based regulation,” which places
that obligation on the regulated entity.57 It requires certain facilities using or storing highly hazardous chemicals to establish comprehensive management programs aimed at preventing or minimizing the consequences of catastrophic releases.58 Process safety management includes a wide range of elements; the
process hazard analysis element—“a careful review of what could go wrong and
what safeguards must be implemented to prevent releases of hazardous chemicals”—is most relevant here.59
The OSHA PSM regulations provide very general minimum requirements
for process hazard analysis (PHA).60 OSHA guidance documents set out some
additional specifics, but essentially leave the details to facilities to work out in
passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990); David Stradling & Richard Stradling, Perceptions
of the Burning River: Deindustrialization and Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River, 13 ENV’T HIST.
515, 518–19 (2008) (describing and questioning the narrative linking the 1969 Cuyahoga
River fire to passage of the Clean Water Act); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 692–96 (1999) (discussing the role of
Love Canal in enactment of Superfund).
54
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 111 (2004); CHARLES
PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 354–56 (1999).
55
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE USE AND STORAGE OF METHYL
ISOCYANATE (MIC) AT BAYER CROPSCIENCE 34–35 (2012) [hereinafter NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL,
BAYER]; Lisa A. Long, History of Process Safety at OSHA, 28 PROCESS SAFETY PROGRESS
128, 129 (2009).
56
29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 (2013).
57
See Charles Sabel et al., Regulation Under Uncertainty: The Coevolution of Industry and
Regulation, 12 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 371, 377 (2018) (defining meta-regulation); Cary
Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management
to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 691 (2003) (defining management-based
regulation).
58
29 C.F.R. § 1910.119.
59
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA 3132, PROCESS SAFETY
MANAGEMENT 5 (2000) [hereinafter OSHA 3132]. OSHA’s PSM requirements include fourteen elements, including training, operating procedures, management of change, incident investigation, and emergency planning and response. 29 C.F.R § 1910.119(c)–(p). Other regulatory agencies and private organizations have developed similar PSM frameworks. See Paul
R. Amyotte & Cathleen S. Lupien, Elements of Process Safety Management, in 1 METHODS IN
CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY 87, 106–10, 115 (Faisal Khan ed., 2017).
60
29 C.F.R. § 1910.119(e) (describing the required focus of the PHA in general terms).
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accordance with generally accepted industry practices.61 Consistent with industry practice, many facilities structure their PHA in five phases, as described in
Table 3.62
While the major focus of PHA is the assessment of risk, most approaches
also expect the PHA team to make recommendations for safety improvements.
Where the process risks are deemed unacceptable, recommendations provide
strategies to reduce that risk. In developing recommendations, facilities follow a
hierarchy of hazard control consisting of passive engineering controls, active engineering controls, and administrative controls in decreasing order of preference.
Administrative controls rely upon human action to direct or check engineered systems or human performance, such as inspections, operator responses
to process deviations, and emergency response procedures. Engineering controls
are equipment or systems designed to “maintain a process within safe operating
limits, to safely shut it down in the event of a process upset, or to reduce human
exposure to the effects of an upset.”63 Passive engineering controls provide protection without the need for automatic or manual activation; think here of dikes
and berms or pressure relief valves. Active engineering controls require activation. Examples include a sprinkler system triggered by a heat or smoke sensor or
a dust suppression system activated by a pressure sensor.
3. Algae
Synthetic biology is an emerging technology enabling the intentional, direct
engineering of organisms to create novel or altered traits. It relies upon the synthesis or modification of DNA and associated genetic material using standardized and automated processes.64 As the National Academy of Science observed,
“engineering principles are applied to reduce genetics into DNA ‘parts’ so that
those parts can be understood in isolation and reassembled into new biological
parts, devices, and whole systems to build desired functions in living cells.”65 As
with many new key enabling technologies, forecasts of the societal benefits of
synthetic biology tend to be ebullient,66 and acknowledgement of the potential
61

See OSHA 3132, supra note 59, at 9–11; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN.,
OSHA 3133, PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE 5–14 (1994)
[hereinafter OSHA 3133].
62
Baybutt, supra note 35, at 502; NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, BAYER, supra note 55, at 132; CTR.
FOR CHEM. PROCESS SAFETY, GUIDELINES FOR HAZARD EVALUATION PROCEDURES 17–18 (3d
ed. 2008) [hereinafter CCPS, GUIDELINES].
63
CCPS, GUIDELINES, supra note 62, at xxiii.
64
Kent H. Redford et al., Synthetic Biology and Conservation of Nature: Wicked Problems
and Wicked Solutions, 11 PLOS BIOLOGY 1 (2013).
65
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., PREPARING FOR FUTURE PRODUCTS OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY 30 (2017) [hereinafter NAT’L ACADS., PREPARING].
66
See OFF. OF SCI. AND TECH. POL’Y, NATIONAL BIOECONOMY BLUEPRINT 15 (2012) [hereinafter OSTP] (noting that synthetic biology “holds vast potential for the bioeconomy, as engineered organisms could dramatically transform modern practices in high-impact fields such
as agriculture, manufacturing, energy generation, and medicine”); James Collins, Bits and
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health and environmental impacts is customary.67 This case study uses the example of microalgae biofuel production to examine risk analysis in the context of
synthetic biology.
Using engineered microalgae to produce “fourth generation” biofuel is one
particularly promising near-term application of synthetic biology.68 The three
prior generations of biofuel production—processes using food crops, low-cost
crops and agricultural residues, and seaweed and algae biomass as feedstock,
respectively—suffer from issues regarding product performance, economic viability, and environmental sustainability. Fourth generation biofuel production
aims to avoid or minimize those problems by tailoring the microalgae to the specific needs of the process.69 Synthetic biology techniques would be used to alter
or enhance a range of the organisms’ traits, including photosynthetic efficiency,
growth rate, resistance to pathogens, and increased lipid (oil) accumulation.70
Large-scale commercial production of biofuels from engineered microalgae
requires the cultivation of large quantities of algae biomass. Cultivation typically
occurs in open, outdoor circular ponds in which the algal broth is continuously
circulated with a paddle wheel. The alternative method of closed photo-bioreactors (which circulate the broth through a system of transparent tubes) provides
greater control over cultivation, but its use is more limited due to cost and energy
demand.71

Pieces Come to Life: Scientists Are Combining Biology and Engineering to Change the World,
483 NATURE S8, S10 (2012) (“Many of the major global problems, such as famine, disease
and energy shortages, have potential solutions in the world of engineered cells.”).
67
See OSTP, supra note 66, at 4 (noting the importance of regulation but observing that when
regulations “are not carefully crafted or become outdated, however, they can become barriers
to innovation and market expansion and discourage investment”); NAT’L ACADS., PREPARING,
supra note 65, at 10 (“The bioeconomy is growing rapidly and the U.S. regulatory system
needs to provide a balanced approach for consideration of the many competing interests in the
face of this expansion.”).
68
Sheeja Jagadevan et al., Recent Developments in Synthetic Biology and Metabolic Engineering in Microalgae Towards Biofuel Production, 11 BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR BIOFUELS 1, 2
(2018); Deborah Scott et al., Potential Positive and Negative Impacts of Components, Organisms and Products Resulting from Synthetic Biology Techniques on The Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, and Associated Social, Economic and Cultural Considerations, in SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 5, 26 (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Technical Ser. No. 82, 2015).
69
See Jagadevan et al., supra note 68, at 2–6; Shashi Kumar, GM Algae for Biofuel Production: Biosafety and Risk Assessment, 9 COLLECTION BIOSAFETY REVS. 52, 55–56 (2015).
70
Ashmita Ghosh et al., Progress Toward Isolation of Strains and Genetically Engineered
Strains of Microalgae for Production of Biofuel and Other Value Added Chemicals: A Review,
113 ENERGY CONVERSION & MGMT. 104, 108, 111, 114 (2016); Kumar, supra note 69, at 57–
58; D. Ryan Georgianna & Stephen P. Mayfield, Exploiting Diversity and Synthetic Biology
for the Production of Algal Biofuels, 488 NATURE 329, 329 (2012).
71
Christina E. Canter et al., Large‐Scale Cultivation of Microalgae for Fuel, in PROCESS
DESIGN STRATEGIES FOR BIOMASS CONVERSION SYSTEMS 135, 140–41 (Denny K. S. Ng. et al.
eds., 2015); Kumar, supra note 69, at 56, 61; Raphael Slade & Ausilio Bauen, Micro-algae
Cultivation for Biofuels: Cost, Energy Balance, Environmental Impacts and Future Prospects,
53 BIOMASS & BIOENERGY 29, 30 (2013).
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Operation of an algal biorefinery using genetically engineered microalgae as
input raises significant environmental and ecological concerns,72 many of which
begin with the unplanned releases. That release might occur when microalgae
are carried away from an open pond by wind, birds, or other vehicles. Or, the
pond or bioreactor may be compromised by an earthquake, flood, or other disaster.73 Whatever the cause, two resulting scenarios in particular stand out. First,
the microalgae’s engineered DNA could find its way into the native algae species’ genome or even other wild organisms, a phenomenon known as horizontal
gene transfer.74 For example, engineered microalgae often contain “marker”
genes, such as genes coding for antibiotic resistance, added to facilitate the engineering and cultivation processes.75 Transfer of that gene beyond the engineered microalgae could exacerbate the existing public health challenges presented by antibiotic resistance caused by other factors. Second, the value-added
traits of the engineered microalgae may give it a competitive advantage over the
native species, fundamentally altering the structure of the ecosystem through a
loss of genetic diversity or unintended spread of undesirable phenotypic traits.76
The EPA regulates the development and use of engineered microalgae for
biofuel production as part of its new chemicals review program under the Toxic
Substances Control Act.77 That statute provides for pre-market review of new
chemicals by the EPA; anyone proposing to manufacture, import, or process microorganisms for commercial purposes must submit a Microbial Commercial
Activity Notice (MCAN) to the EPA.78 Commercial activity may not begin until
a ninety-day period for EPA review has expired. During that review period, the
agency must determine whether the microorganism presents an “unreasonable
risk.”79 Table 4 describes the EPA’s risk assessment process for 90-day reviews
of MCANs. If the agency concludes that the organism is unlikely to present an
unreasonable risk under the intended or reasonably foreseeable conditions of use,
production can begin. If instead the EPA determines that the microorganism may
present an unreasonable risk or that knowledge gaps prevent a reasoned

72

Scott et al., supra note 68, at 31–33; David J. Glass, Government Regulation of the Uses of
Genetically Modified Algae and Other Microorganisms in Biofuel and Bio-Based Chemical
Production, in ALGAL BIOREFINERIES 23, 26–30 (Ales Prokop et al. eds., 2015).
73
See Kumar, supra note 69, at 60; Allison A. Snow & Val H. Smith, Genetically Engineered
Algae for Biofuels: A Key Role for Ecologists, 62 BIOSCIENCE 765, 765–66 (2012).
74
Kumar, supra note 69, at 61; Glass, supra note 72, at 28.
75
Monika Hlavova et al., Improving Microalgae for Biotechnology—From Genetics to Synthetic Biology, 33 BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVANCES 1194, 1196, 1199 (2015).
76
Scott et al., supra note 68, at 10; Snow & Smith, supra note 73, at 766–67.
77
See generally Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–09; ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
DRAFT ALGAE GUIDANCE FOR THE PREPARATION OF TSCA BIOTECHNOLOGY SUBMISSIONS 1
(2016) [hereinafter EPA, ALGAE GUIDANCE].
78
40 C.F.R. § 725.100 (1997).
79
15 U.S.C. § 2604 (a)(3)(A).
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evaluation of the risks, the EPA must issue a regulation or administrative order
protecting against potential risks.80
TABLE 3: RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESSES
Phase

Pesticides:
Facility Safety:
Synthetic Biology:
DPR
OSHA
EPA
Characterization Hazard
Hazard
Hazard
of the Threat
Identification: Identifies Identification: Involves de- Identification: Begins
the range of adverse ef- tecting hazards associated with with genetically engineered
fects by evaluating hu- the process in question, inmaterial (GEM) characteriman data and animal
cluding scenarios such as
zation,82 followed by (1) a
testing. Human inforfires, explosions, releases of “Construct Hazard Analymation tends to be
toxic chemicals, and spills.
sis” to identify hazards assparse; most emphasis is The PHA team will choose
sociated with the engiplaced upon in vitro ani- from a range of methods de- neered modifications,
mal testing.
pending upon the complexity including horizontal gene
of the process, the experience transfer, (2) a Human
and training of the team mem- Health Hazard Assessment,
bers, and other factors.81
and (3) an Ecological Hazard Assessment. The EPA
evaluates human health and
ecological hazard qualitatively and, when data is
available, quantitatively.83
Assessment of In- Exposure Assessment: Consequence Likelihood As- Engineering and Expoteraction
Uses data about the
sessment: Estimates the likeli- sure Assessments: The enphysical and chemical hood that the relevant scenar- gineering assessment idencharacteristics of the
ios will occur. Typically, the tifies how, under the
pesticide, along with
estimate will be based on the reasonably foreseen condifield studies and comteam members’ experience
tions of use, the GEM
puter modeling, to pre- and, where available, failure could reach workers or the
dict levels of the pesti- rates at the plant and in the
environment during manucide that individuals will
facturing and in field
80

15 U.S.C. § 2604(e) (regarding a finding of insufficient information); § 2604(f) (regarding
a finding of unreasonable risk). EPA action on insufficient information is limited to issuance
of administrative orders pending submission of the information. In the event of a finding that
the microorganism presents an unreasonable risk, the agency may issue an order or regulation.
81
All the methods aim to identify the sequence of events by which an “initiating event” (or
what we might call a “cause”) could result in an actual incident. Initiating events are generally
equipment or software failures, human errors, and external events. CCPS, GUIDELINES, supra
note 62, at 20. Some methods are inductive, identifying initiating events through brainstorming, “what-if” analyses, standard checklists, or other means and tracking them forward as they
progress to adverse impacts. Others, such as Fault Tree Analysis, are deductive in that they
begin with a consequence of concern and trace back through the chain of events to the initiating event. Id. at 212–13; Baybutt, supra note 35, at 545–46, 548–49. For useful summaries of
the various common methods, see OSHA 3133, supra note 61, at 30–32. See generally
CHARLES YOE, PRINCIPLES OF RISK ANALYSIS: DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 273
(2019).
82
EPA, ALGAE GUIDANCE, supra note 77, at 1–2, 4 (including verification of the taxonomy
of the GEM and analysis of its genetic construction).
83
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, POINTS TO CONSIDER WHEN PREPARING TSCA NEW CHEMICAL
NOTIFICATIONS 12–13 (2018) [hereinafter EPA, POINTS TO CONSIDER]. Hazard is scored on a
qualitative three-point scale ranging from “low” to “high.” Id. Chemicals having a low hazard
score and a production volume below 100,000 kg per year are typically dropped from further
review.
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Phase

Pesticides:
DPR
inhale, ingest, or absorb
through their skin.84

Assessment of
Vulnerability

Dose-Response Assessment: Identifies the
quantitative relationship
between the dose (i.e.,
the amount of chemical a
person is exposed to)
and the expected toxic
effect.88

Identification of
Consequential
Impacts

Risk Characterization:
Essentially, integrates
the analysis and conclusions of the prior phases.
Generally speaking, the
agency determines
whether expected level
of exposure (as estimated in the exposure
assessment) will exceed
the acceptable level

84

Facility Safety:
OSHA
industry generally.85 Likelihood is commonly expressed
using an order-of-magnitude
scale (e.g., once per century,
decade, year, and so on).86
Consequence Severity Assessment: Consequences are
defined as “the direct impact
of the hazard scenario in terms
of its effects on receptors such
as people, the environment,
property, or equipment, the
process, the company, and so
on.”89 Methods for establishing the severity of consequences vary widely, ranging
from qualitative approaches
relying upon the collective experience and judgment of the
PHA team members to sophisticated, complex quantitative
methods.90
Risk Characterization: Integrates the prior assessments of
the severity and likelihood of
the potential consequences.91
Again, approaches to risk
characterization vary along the
qualitative/quantitative range,
but most PHAs use a qualitative or semi-quantitative approach.92

163
Synthetic Biology:
EPA
applications. Based on the
engineering assessment, an
exposure assessment focuses on environmental
and human exposure.87

Risk Characterization:
Integrates the hazard and
exposure assessments, categorizing the GEM as either (1) not presenting an
unreasonable risk and thus
dropped from further review; (2) presenting an unreasonable risk but for
which risk management decisions can be made

DPR, GUIDE, supra note 46, at 47–50. The agency considers fate and transport of the pesticide, meaning how the material may travel through the air, water, and other media to reach
individuals. Id. at 49–50. It also predicts how much of the material will enter the individual’s
body, taking into account the physical and behavioral characteristics of that person. Id. at 49.
For example, the agency will typically generate specific exposure levels for workers and children and adult bystanders. Id.
85
Baybutt, supra note 35, at 529–30; CCPS, GUIDELINES, supra note 62, at 217–18.
86
CCPS, GUIDELINES, supra note 62, at 217–18. Some facilities may use quantitative methods
for certain processes, particularly those that could give rise to catastrophic consequences. Baybutt, supra note 35, at 530; YOE, supra note 81, at 114.
87
EPA, ALGAE GUIDANCE, supra note 77, at 5.
88
DPR, GUIDE, supra note 46, at 47.
89
Baybutt, supra note 35, at 502.
90
CCPS, GUIDELINES, supra note 62, at 215; YOE, supra note 81, at 112. Many methods make
use of an impact severity scale or other metric to categorize consequences and their impacts.
Baybutt, supra note 35, at 503–04; CCPS, GUIDELINES, supra note 62, at 215.
91
YOE, supra note 81, at 119; CCPS, GUIDELINES, supra note 62, at 220.
92
CCPS, GUIDELINES, supra note 62, at 220–21. Quantitative methods include Layer of Protection Analysis (a simplified form of quantitative risk characterization) and more comprehensive Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis. See id. at 223–30 (LOPA); CNTR. FOR
CHEM. PROCESS SAFETY, GUIDELINES FOR CHEMICAL PROCESS QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS
395–451 (2000) (quantitative methods).
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Phase

Pesticides:
Facility Safety:
DPR
OSHA
(based upon the dose response assessment.) The
risk characterization also
describes uncertainties
present and explains the
assumptions made or adjustments adopted to address those uncertainties.

[Vol. 22:1
Synthetic Biology:
EPA
without additional review;
or (3) presenting an unreasonable risk that requires
additional risk characterization.93

C. Limitations of Conventional Risk Analysis
This Section identifies limitations of conventional risk analysis as practiced
in the case studies, limitations that have given rise to dissatisfaction and calls for
reform.94 By conventional risk analysis, I refer to risk analysis as it is actually
practiced “on the ground.” As previously noted, the notion of risk analysis takes
many forms, and indeed, many of the major theoretical articulations of it and
related concepts address the limitations discussed below.95 But it is no answer to
the continuing deficiencies in the practice of risk analysis to say that theories of
risk analysis are on the job.
1. Data Availability
Risk analysis typically requires a significant amount of data. Data about hazards, about the likelihood and scope of the interactions, about the ultimate consequences, and more. This data is needed for all aspects of risk analysis. Consider
the pesticide case study. Problem formulation calls for data to determine which
of the dozens of potential toxicological endpoints the risk assessment should consider, and which of the multiple potential vulnerable subjects to focus upon.96
The risk assessment itself relies heavily upon experimental and empirical data
regarding toxicity and exposure drawn from in vitro analyses, animal testing, and
epidemiological studies, as well as fate and transport analyses and modeling.97
93

ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, CHEMISTRY ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR PREMANUFACTURE
NOTIFICATION SUBMITTERS 35 (1997); EPA, POINTS TO CONSIDER, supra note 83, at 34 (stating
the third category is sent on to “Standard Review,” during which the EPA performs a more indepth evaluation, usually including newly available information provided by the manufacturer).
94
Malloy, Principled Prevention, supra note 12, at 131–35.
95
See ORTWIN RENN, INT’L RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, RISK GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS AN
INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 36–37, 39–41 (2006) (setting out an extensive methodology for identifying, assessing, and responding to risk, broadly defined); PCCRARM, supra note 28, at 3
(describing an integrated set of steps for comprehensive risk assessment and management).
96
DPR, GUIDE, supra note 46, at 46–49; NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SILVER BOOK, supra note 28,
at 77–79.
97
See RISK ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICALS: AN INTRODUCTION 235–37 (C.J. van Leeuwen &
T.G. Vermeire eds., 2d ed. 2007) (stating not all risk assessment leads to quantification of risk.
Depending upon the needs of the decisionmaker and the availability of data, a qualitative
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To varying degrees and for sundry reasons, that data may be unavailable at the
time the decision is being made.
One major impediment to data availability is cost in terms of dollars and
resources. Toxicity testing in the pesticide registration setting is illustrative. Depending upon the endpoint in question, testing can run from several thousand to
more than a million dollars and sacrifice hundreds to thousands of animals, as
seen in Table 4, below. California’s program calls for testing for almost thirty
human and ecological endpoints.98 Pesticide manufacturers (and in some cases,
regulators as well) seek to minimize costly or time-consuming testing requirements. They may rely on existing testing results in the academic literature or
produced for other purposes, even where the test methods or data quality fail to
meet the formal regulatory standards. Or, they may take advantage—rightly or
wrongly—of exemptions from testing in the agency’s regulations or informal
practices.99
TABLE 4: SELECTED TOXICITY TESTING COSTS100
Endpoint
Acute Toxicity
Fish Early Life Stage Toxicity
Reproductive Toxicity (across 2 generations)
Carcinogenicity

Animal (Number
used)
Rat (40)
Rainbow Trout (480)
Rat (2600)

Cost

Mouse (400)

$1,675,000

$ 18,000
$ 73,000
$ 420,000

In other instances, data gaps may result from a lack of technical or scientific
capacity rather than economics. It may be that existing testing methods or analytic approaches cannot produce the desired data. Take the case of emerging
technologies such as engineered nanomaterials, defined as materials with one or
more dimensions at a size range of approximately one to one hundred nanometers.101 Nanomaterials, such as carbon nanotubes, quantum dots, and fullerenes,
exhibit unique chemical and physical properties, enabling often-astounding socially beneficial advances in materials engineering, electronics, medicine, and
assessment of the risk may be sufficient.); see also David M. Zalk & Deborah Imel Nelson,
History and Evolution of Control Banding: A Review, 5 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T HYGIENE
330, 332–33 (2008) (describing qualitative methods of risk assessment used in industrial hygiene settings).
98
Kristie Sullivan et al., A Discussion of the Impact of US Chemical Regulation Legislation
on the Field of Toxicity Testing, 25 TOXICOLOGY IN VITRO 1231, 1233 (2011).
99
See JOHN FROINES ET AL., RISK AND DECISION: EVALUATING PESTICIDE APPROVAL IN
CALIFORNIA 10–11 (2013) (discussing efforts to avoid testing requirement for neurodevelopmental toxicity in the registration of methyl iodide).
100
STEPHANIE SUAZO, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EXPEDITED NEW USE
RULE FOR FIFTEEN CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES, at D-3 (2013); Sullivan et al., supra note 98, at
1233.
101
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, WORKING GUIDANCE ON EPA’S SECTION 8(A) INFORMATION
GATHERING RULE ON NANOMATERIALS IN COMMERCE 1 (2017).
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other areas.102 Yet these same qualities made it difficult to use standard testing
methods on those materials. Nanomaterials do not disperse in solution or move
through biological systems as expected; they confounded well-established assays. For years, toxicologists and exposure scientists faced significant challenges
in assessing the toxicity and fate and transport of numerous nanomaterials.103
Over time, science caught up, and toxicity testing methods, environmental monitoring, and dispersion modeling adapted to the new nano-reality.104 But in the
meantime, risk analysts faced decisions with a paucity of data.
2. Ignorance and Complexity
Conventional risk analysis depends upon risk assessment to predict consequences of actions or events with some level of certainty (or uncertainty).105 Will
a process unit rupture during normal operations? Would a farmworker wearing a
respirator suffer ill effects from a fumigant pesticide? Will an escaped strain of
genetically engineered green algae flourish in a lake? Risk assessment is designed to answer these sorts of questions, but the answers typically will be subject to some uncertainty. For our purposes, uncertainty means the degree to
which a calculated value or expected outcome may differ from the actual value
or outcome.106 Uncertainty can result from a range of factors, such as limited
information requiring use of estimation or default assumptions, measurement difficulties and human error, or incomplete or mistaken understanding of how a
system (e.g., an ecosystem or market) operates.107

102

Andrew D. Maynard, Nanotechnology: The Next Big Thing, or Much Ado About Nothing?,
51 ANN. OCCUPATIONAL HYGIENE 1, 2–3 (2007).
103
Georgia Miller & Fern Wickson, Risk Analysis of Nanomaterials: Exposing Nanotechnology’s Naked Emperor, 32 REV. POL’Y RSCH. 485, 497–98 (2015); Elijah J. Petersen et al.,
Adapting OECD Aquatic Toxicity Tests for Use with Manufactured Nanomaterials: Key Issues
and Consensus Recommendations, 49 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 9532, 9533, 9535 (2015); Rina
Guadagnini et al., Toxicity Screenings of Nanomaterials: Challenges Due to Interference with
Assay Processes and Components of Classic In Vitro Tests, 9 NANOTOXICOLOGY 13, 14
(2013).
104
Petersen et al., supra note 103, at 9536–37. But see Miller & Wickson, supra note 103, at
487 (arguing that even in 2015, risk assessment for nanomaterials is ineffective “both because
of the overarching deficiencies of risk analysis but also because of the specific barriers to
performing reliable risk analysis for nanomaterials”).
105
RISK ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICALS, supra note 97, at 21–23; see also Adam M. Finkel &
George Gray, Taking the Reins: How Regulatory Decision-Makers Can Stop Being Hijacked
by Uncertainty, 38 ENV’T SYS. & DECISIONS 230, 231–32 (2018) (describing advanced methods for quantitative uncertainty analysis in risk assessment).
106
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SILVER BOOK, supra note 28, at 97; SOC’Y FOR RISK ANALYSIS,
SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS GLOSSARY 4 (2018).
107
See RISK ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICALS, supra note 97, at 22; see also GLEN W. SUTER II,
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 70 (2d ed. 2007).
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Sometimes, uncertainty can be reduced or eliminated by collecting more information.108 Resolving uncertainty in this way can be impractical due to time,
cost, and methodological constraints, so risk analysts often use other methods to
address uncertainties or even simply describe them to decision-makers. At the
most basic level, default values or assumptions can be used to fill in gaps in
knowledge. In human-health risk assessment, toxicity testing on rats is used to
draw conclusions regarding certain potential effects in humans, but the variation
between the two species is uncertain. Toxicologists commonly apply a default
assessment factor of ten to account for the expected greater sensitivity of humans
to toxins.109 Other, more sophisticated techniques, including sensitivity analysis
and quantitative uncertainty analysis, may be used to describe the level of uncertainty, permitting risk managers to take uncertainty explicitly into account in
crafting and evaluating mitigation options.110
Yet all of these approaches for dealing with uncertainty—default assumptions, qualitative methods, and quantitative uncertainty analysis—presume that
the risk analyst has a fairly complete understanding of the set of potential threats,
interactions, and impacts involved. Where that understanding is absent, uncertainty is eclipsed by ignorance,111 and conventional risk analysis is hobbled.112
108

YOE, supra note 81, at 34 (describing epistemic or knowledge uncertainty and distinguishing it from variability (or aleatory uncertainty), which reflects “the inherent variability in the
physical world”); RISK ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICALS, supra note 97, at 21.
109
See RISK ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICALS, supra note 97, at 266–67; YOE, supra note 81, at
14–15.
110
Finkel & Gray, supra note 105, at 230–32; Julie Shortridge et al., Risk Assessment Under
Deep Uncertainty: A Methodological Comparison, 159 RELIABILITY ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY
12, 12, 14–16 (2017) (evaluating qualitative uncertainty factors, probability bounds, and robust decision-making); NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SILVER BOOK, supra note 28, at 99–104 (describing techniques for uncertainty analysis); RISK ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICALS, supra note 97,
at 23.
111
Andy Stirling & David Gee, Science, Precaution, and Practice, 117 PUB. HEALTH REPS.
521, 524–25 (2002) (using the broad term “incertitude,” which included risk, uncertainty, ambiguity, and ignorance); Robin M. Hogarth & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Making Under
Ignorance: Arguing with Yourself, 10 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 15, 16 (1995). Other formulations that capture the same concepts but use slightly different definitions exist. See, e.g., Andreas Klinke & Ortwin Renn, A New Approach to Risk Evaluation and Management: RiskBased, Precaution-Based, and Discourse-Based Strategies, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 1071, 1079–80
(2002) (describing uncertainty as including variability, systematic and random measurement
errors, indeterminacy, and lack of knowledge (ignorance of relevant variables or information)); William D. Rowe, Understanding Uncertainty, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 743, 745–48
(1994) (discussing metrical, structural, temporal, and translational uncertainty).
112
Timothy Malloy et al., Risk-Based and Prevention-Based Governance for Emerging Materials, 50 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 6822, 6822 (2016); Stirling & Gee, supra note 111, at 525–26.
But see T. Aven & R. Steen, The Concept of Ignorance in Risk Assessment and Risk Management Context, 95 RELIABILITY ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY 1117, 1117, 1121 (2010) (arguing that
risk assessment could still be used for describing uncertainties and would be useful in “defining appropriate management policies and strategies”). The story of the regulatory response to
endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs) likewise provides a stark example of the frustrating
effects of ignorance on conventional risk analysis. Nina Honkela et al., Coming to Grips with
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Ignorance is present where the analyst lacks knowledge about the nature of
the threat, the form of the interactions, and the potential associated impacts.113
Risk analysts regularly face ignorance when dealing with complex adaptive systems.114 A complex adaptive system consists of a set of interconnected units or
entities organized into a collective whole that uses information, generates (sometimes unpredictable) patterns and behaviors, and learns or evolves.115 We are
surrounded by and immersed in ecological, social, and technical complex systems, including the communities in which we live, the legal systems we work
within and write about, the intermodal transportation systems we use to move
about, and more.116
Complex adaptive systems have certain attributes that distinguish them from
merely complicated systems.117 Three are of particular relevance here: network
connectivity, nonlinearity, and emergence. The various parts of a complex system are networked together with feedback loops through which resources and
information flow, allowing the system to continuously respond to changes in

Scientific Ignorance in the Governance of Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals and Nanoparticles, 38 ENV’T SCI. & POL’Y 154, 158 (2014). The significant ignorance of the mechanisms by
which EDCs operate within the body and the breadth of the physiological and behavioral consequences has undermined the usefulness of conventional risk assessment methods. Vivian
Futran Fuhrman et al., Why Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals (EDCs) Challenge Traditional
Risk Assessment and How to Respond, 286 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 589, 591 (2015) (concluding that “detailed, systematic, standardized risk assessment paradigm for EDCs has not
been established”).
113
Stirling & Gee, supra note 111, at 525–26; Renn & Klinke, supra note 24, at 2, 5. Sterling
and Gee group ignorance together with risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity as forms of “incertitude.” For them, ambiguity exists where there is sufficient knowledge to assess some types of
impacts, but other potential impacts are poorly defined. For other definitions of ignorance, see
Aven & Steen, supra note 112, at 1118–19.
114
See generally DONELLA H. MEADOWS, THINKING IN SYSTEMS: A PRIMER 35–72 (Diana
Wright ed., 2008) (providing an overview of different types of complex systems).
115
MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 4 (2009).
A system is a set of things—people, cells, molecules, or whatever—interconnected in such a way
that they produce their own pattern of behavior over time. The system may be buffeted, constricted, triggered, or driven by outside forces. But the system’s response to these forces is characteristic of itself, and that response is seldom simple in the real world.

MEADOWS, supra note 114, at 2. Definitions of complexity and complex systems are legion.
Quantum physicist Seth Lloyd counted at least forty-two definitions of complexity in his informal survey of the literature; the actual number is likely much higher. SETH LLOYD,
PROGRAMMING THE UNIVERSE: A QUANTUM COMPUTER SCIENTIST TAKES ON THE COSMOS
186–89 (2006). For our purposes, Melanie Mitchell’s definition will do.
116
See generally MEADOWS, supra note 114, at 35–72 (describing a variety of technical, economic, and social systems); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive
System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34
HOUSTON L. REV. 933, 935, 942–43 (1997) (analyzing environmental law as a complex adaptive system).
117
More specifically, the distinguishing features belong variously to the complex system and
the agents that comprise it, respectively. See J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 885, 892–901 (2008) (discussing the agent and system properties that characterize complex adaptive systems).
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relevant variables.118 Nonlinearity relates to the cause-and-effect relationships in
a complex system; the system does not respond to stimuli or disruption in a linear
or proportionate fashion. A small change in one variable can result in an unexpectedly large shift in the behavior of the system or its parts.119 Lastly, system
behavior emerges from the nonlinear, dynamic interactions of actors and variables within the system, behavior that cannot be predicted by analyzing the behavior of individual system parts.120
Predicting impacts of genetically engineered microorganisms escaping to the
environment means grappling with the behavior of a classic complex adaptive
system: an ecosystem. Synthetic biology thus provides a stark example of the
frustrating effects of ignorance on conventional risk analysis. Consider two of
the most chilling concerns regarding engineered microalgae: horizontal gene
transfer (HGT) and invasiveness. HGT (also known as lateral gene transfer) refers to the transfer of genetic material from one organism to another, other than
through the typical vertical transmission of genes from parent to offspring.121
HGT occurs naturally in ecosystems and is typically benign and even beneficial.122 Yet it raises the potential for unintended consequences in various ways:
for example, the transfer of antibiotic resistance or traits relating to fitness and
growth to wild strain bacteria.123 Different transgenes originating from unrelated
fugitive engineered microalgae could even end up “stacked” in a single wild
strain with unpredictable results.124 Conventional ecological risk assessment
methods do not have the capacity to evaluate these issues.125 Likewise, although
laboratory experiments and modeling have shown that microalgae optimized for
biofuel production compete poorly against native algae, there is a strong, consistent literature demonstrating that such reductionist approaches are unable to
predict real-world impacts.126
Complexity concerns regarding conventional risk analysis are not limited to
human interactions with natural systems. Similar concerns arise with respect to
the interaction of humans with the technical and institutional systems to which
118

Id. at 898.
See id.; see also INT’L INST. FOR APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 32–33 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978) [hereinafter Holling (ed.),
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT].
120
Ruhl, supra note 117, at 899.
121
Patrick J. Keeling & Jeffrey D. Palmer, Horizontal Gene Transfer in Eukaryotic Evolution,
9 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 605, 605 (2008).
122
Joel P. Hewett et al., Human Health and Environmental Risks Posed by Synthetic Biology
R&D for Energy Applications: A Literature Analysis, 21 APPLIED BIOSAFETY 177, 181 (2016);
Natalie Jing Ma & Farren J. Isaacs, Genomic Recoding Broadly Obstructs the Propagation of
Horizontally Transferred Genetic Elements, 3 CELL SYS. 199, 199 (2016); Christopher M.
Thomas & Kaare M. Nielsen, Mechanisms of, and Barriers to, Horizontal Gene Transfer between Bacteria, 3 NATURE REVS.: MICROBIOLOGY 711, 711–12 (2005).
123
Hewett, supra note 122, at 181; Snow & Smith, supra note 73, at 766–67.
124
Hewett, supra note 122, at 181.
125
Snow & Smith, supra note 73, at 766–67.
126
Jonathan Gressel et al., Cultivated Microalgae Spills: Hard to Predict/Easier to Mitigate
Risks, 32 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 65, 65–66 (2014).
119
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they belong.127 Consider the types of sophisticated industrial plants that perform
process hazard analyses under OSHA’s process safety management rule. Despite
these and other extensive regulatory requirements, industrial accidents continue
to occur. “Normal accident” theory, developed by sociologist Charles Perrow,
posits that serious process incidents are to be expected due to the facilities’ complex, tightly coupled nature.128 Many industrial processes or plants are “interactively complex” in that they consist of numerous subsystems continuously interacting through feedback loops.129 Moreover, the processes at such facilities are
often tightly coupled, meaning that a change in the status of one system or subsystem can affect associated units quickly. The relatively short time between the
initiating event and the ultimate consequences can prevent the plant operators
from detecting and properly evaluating the developing problem.130 Thus, in a
normal accident, interactive complexity generates a cascading set of unexpected
deviations, and tight coupling impairs the capacity of system operators to evaluate, understand, and respond.131
Normal accident theory is unimpressed by regimented process safety management programs and their engineering and administrative controls. For Perrow
and others, these technical and organizational measures themselves may contribute to the likelihood of a normal accident. Alarms, interlocks, and engineering
controls can increase system complexity and lead to unexpected interactions.
New safety and operating procedures can limit flexibility and situational awareness of operators, exacerbating the taut linkages among subsystems.132 As Perrow notes, “redundancies and safety systems are the biggest single source of catastrophic failure in complex, tightly coupled systems.”133
3. Indeterminacy
Conventional risk analysis is also problematic in contexts involving significant indeterminacy.134 At its core, risk analysis aims to understand and predict
127

See Johan Bergstrom et al., On the Rationale of Resilience in the Domain of Safety: A
Literature Review, 141 RELIABILITY ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY 131, 134 (2015) (providing an
overview of literature on complexity as a barrier to conventional risk assessment in the facility
safety field).
128
PERROW, supra note 54, at 5, 101, 122.
129
Id. at 77–78; Frederick G. Wolf, Operationalizing and Testing Normal Accident Theory in
Petrochemical Plants and Refineries, 10 PRODUCTION & OPERATIONS MGMT. 292, 296–97
(2001) (generating a “complexity index” for measuring complexity in thirty-six petroleum refineries as part of an empirical test of normal accident theory).
130
See PERROW, supra note 54, at 108–10, 115–17.
131
Karen Marais et al., Beyond Normal Accidents and High Reliability Organizations: The
Need for an Alternative Approach to Safety in Complex Systems 2 (Mar. 24, 2004) (presented
at the Engineering Systems Division Symposium, MIT).
132
Charles Perrow, Organizing to Reduce the Vulnerabilities of Complexity, 7 J.
CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 150, 151–52 (1999); SCOTT D. SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF
SAFETY: ORGANIZATIONS, ACCIDENTS, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 36–43 (1993).
133
Perrow, supra note 132, at 152.
134
Miller & Wickson, supra note 103, at 492.
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the causal chains that run between a threat and its ultimate consequences. Indeterminacy refers to the open nature of such causal chains, particularly with respect to the remarkable unpredictability of human behavior, individually and in
the aggregate.135 Humans and social organizations in the real world often act in
ways that deviate, sometimes substantially, from the assumptions made about
human behavior by risk assessors and risk managers. Yet those assumptions are
sticky.136 Several examples from our case studies illustrate this point.
Let’s begin with risk assessment in the EPA’s new chemical review program. In assessing the hazards and exposures associated with a chemical or
GEM, the EPA considers only the proposed use, known uses, and reasonably
foreseen uses of the material.137 The line-drawing between foreseen and unforeseen uses is critical; those uses deemed unforeseen by the agency are not evaluated in the risk assessment. It appears that the EPA does not consider accidental
spills or releases caused by natural causes or nefarious acts, all of which regrettably occur more frequently than we would like.138 A recent determination by the
EPA regarding an MCAN submitted for a genetically engineered microorganism
indicates that the EPA applies similar reasoning in this context. On the way to
concluding that the microorganism is not likely to present an unreasonable risk,
the agency found only one condition of use(production of biofuel) and no reasonably foreseen condition of use.139 It is difficult to square the agency’s

135

Ibo van de Poel & Zoe Rabaey, Safe-by-Design: From Safety to Responsibility, 11
NANOETHICS 297, 299 (2017); Brian Wynne, Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: Reconceiving Science and Policy in the Preventive Paradigm, 2 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 111, 117–
19 (1992). While this definition appears to be generally accepted, some aspects of the term
indeterminacy are subject to debate. For example, there are contrasting views as to whether
indeterminacy is simply a form of uncertainty or ambiguity or instead stands alone as different
in kind. See Stirling & Gee, supra note 111, at 525 (characterizing it as a form of ambiguity);
Wynne, supra, at 116, 118 (defining indeterminacy as distinct from uncertainty). For our purposes the distinction is unimportant as we are focused on the functional impact of indeterminacy on risk analysis.
136

The extra concept of indeterminacy, therefore, introduces the idea that contingent social behaviour
also has to be explicitly included in the analytical and prescriptive framework. (Of course, behavioural regulation is already implied in technical standards, but the full extent of contingency and
indeterminacy, and the implications of this, are not recognized.

Wynne, supra note 135, at 119.
137
EPA, POINTS TO CONSIDER, supra note 83, at 2, 2 n.2; 40 C.F.R. § 702.33(5) (2021) (“Conditions of use means the circumstances, as determined by the Administrator, under which a
chemical substance is intended, known, or reasonably foreseen to be manufactured, processed,
distributed in commerce, used, or disposed of.”).
138
ENV’T DEF. FUND, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND COMMENTS ON TEN PROBLEM
FORMULATIONS UNDER THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 57 (2018) (commenting upon
EPA’s scoping document for ten chemicals undergoing risk evaluation under the existing
chemicals program).
139
Env’t Prot. Agency, TSCA Section 5(a)(3) Determination for Microbial Commercial Activity Notice (MCAN) J-18-0004 to 0009 (Sept. 6, 2018).
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conclusion with the consistently voiced concern in the scientific literature about
accidental, intentional, or disaster-related releases.140
Indeterminacy is also present with respect to risk mitigation, as reflected in
California’s pesticide regulation program. DPR regularly relies upon personal
protective equipment, such as respirators, as a mitigation measure to keep exposures at or below acceptable levels.141 But industrial hygiene and worker safety
research has shown that workers consistently resist using respirators; when they
do don respirators, many workers use them improperly.142 The administrative
measures favored by the industry in process safety management for mitigation
of hazards suffer from the same vulnerability. Standard operating procedures,
inspections, and emergency response depend heavily on conscientious and consistent implementation by people. And people fail in unexpected ways due to
fatigue, inattention, cognitive biases, and other factors.143 Over time, repeated
inadvertent or intentional deviations from mandatory procedures or policy can
become normalized among workers within an organization.144
Some view indeterminacy as just another manifestation of complexity, in
this case taking into account the role of humans as participants in a complex,
unpredictable system.145 Fair enough. There certainly is an overlap with complexity in that social systems can exhibit emergent behavior. And normal accident theory—which itself is grounded in notions of complexity—recognizes human behavior as an important aspect of interactive complexity. But
indeterminacy has relevance beyond complex systems. It can be a substantial
factor the causal chains present in complicated or even simple systems as well.
II. BEYOND CONVENTIONAL RISK ANALYSIS: PREVENTION AND RESILIENCE
This Part first provides a look at the respective origins and basic tenets of
prevention and resilience. It concludes by examining the ways in which prevention and resilience could complement conventional risk analysis, mapping the
two onto the risk analysis frame discussed in Part I.

140

Scott et al., supra note 68, at 34; Gressel et al., supra note 126, at 65–66; Slade & Bauen,
supra note 71, at 33–35.
141
DPR, GUIDE, supra note 46, at 55; FROINES ET AL., supra note 99, at 15 (discussing DPR’s
evaluation of respirators for mitigation of exposure to methyl iodide).
142
See FROINES ET AL., supra note 99, at 15–16; see also American Thoracic Society, Respiratory Protection Guidelines, 154 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1153, 1161–62
(1996).
143
H. Landis “Lanny” Floyd II & Anna H.L. Floyd, Residual Risk and the Psychology of
Lower Order Controls, 53 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUS. APPLICATIONS 6009, 6012–13
(2017).
144
See Shakeel H. Kadri & David W. Jones, Nurturing a Strong Process Safety Culture, 25
PROCESS SAFETY PROGRESS 16, 18 (2006).
145
See C. Butler et al., Public Values for Energy Futures: Framing, Indeterminacy and Policy
Making, 87 ENERGY POL’Y 665, 666–67 (2015) (casting indeterminacy as arising in the context
of complexity).
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A. Prevention
When Benjamin Franklin observed in 1735 that “an [o]unce of [p]revention
is worth a [p]ound of [c]ure,”146 he was discussing fire safety, but that perspective on prevention has a long history in medicine and public health.147 John
Snow, often hailed as the father of epidemiology, attained mythic status as far as
prevention goes by persuading local authorities in 1854 to remove the handle
from the Broad Street water pump, which he believed to be the source of a cholera outbreak.148 Residents were thus forced to obtain water elsewhere, and the
outbreak stemmed. 149 By the mid-twentieth century, the concept of prevention
was formalized in the fields of medicine and public health. Prevention interventions were classified as primary (avoiding the onset of disease), secondary (reducing the occurrence of the disease’s impacts), or tertiary (treating the impacts
that do occur).150 Debate over the particular types and meanings of the classifications continues.151 This history of prevention provides some help in puzzling
through the term’s meaning in environmental law and occupational safety and
health.
A major difficulty in articulating the prevention principle is the pervasive
use of the word “prevent” in a variety of legal contexts. Domestic U.S. law and
international law often speak of “preventing” risk or environmental degradation
or call for “preventative measure[s]” in response to particular risks.152 In almost
146

The Electric Ben Franklin: Philadelphia: In Case of Fire, USHISTORY.ORG,
http://www.ushistory.org/franklin/philadelphia/fire.htm [perma.cc/SR88-F846].
147
For a history of prevention in medicine from ancient times through the 1700s, see George
Rosen, Historical Evolution of Primary Prevention, 51 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 9, 9–14
(1975).
148
George W. Albee & Kimberly D. Ryan-Finn, An Overview of Primary Prevention, 72 J.
COUNSELING & DEV. 115, 117 (1993).
149
Id. It is worth noting that cholera was already receding from the affected neighborhood by
the time Snow persuaded officials to remove the pump handle. Nigel Paneth, Assessing the
Contributions of John Snow to Epidemiology: 150 Years After Removal of the Broad Street
Pump Handle, 15 EPIDEMIOLOGY 514, 514 (2004); George Davey Smith, Commentary: Behind
the Broad Street Pump: Aetiology, Epidemiology and Prevention of Cholera in Mid-19th Century Britain, 31 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 920, 922, 924–25 (2002).
150
1 COMM’N ON CHRONIC ILLNESS, CHRONIC ILLNESS IN THE UNITED STATES: PREVENTION OF
CHRONIC ILLNESS 16 (1957).
151
Martin Bloom & Thomas P. Gullotta, Definitions of Primary Prevention, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIMARY PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION 3, 6–10 (Thomas P. Gullotta & Martin Bloom eds., 2d ed. 2014); LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC
HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 15–17 (3d ed. 2016). A loose version of that tripartite
characterization of prevention made its way into environmental law and policy. For example,
in the facility safety area, Ashford and his colleagues mapped substitution of hazardous materials, control of exposure, and response/remediation after release onto the primary, secondary,
and tertiary classifications, respectively. NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD ET AL., THE ENCOURAGEMENT
OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE FOR PREVENTING CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS: MOVING FIRMS FROM
SECONDARY PREVENTION AND MITIGATION TO PRIMARY PREVENTION, at VIII-2 (1993).
152
See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (requiring USEPA to take action to “prevent” risk associated with
certain chemicals); 15 U.S.C. § 2643(d)(6) (defining “preventative measures” for dealing with
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every case, however, those terms are left undefined. Prevention could mean at
least two different things in those contexts. In its broadest sense, prevention
could refer to any measure that reduces or ostensibly eliminates a harm or risk of
harm. For example, in the case of air pollution, a pollution control device that
captures and destroys benzene emissions from a refinery process unit could be
said to prevent harms associated with those emissions. The narrower view of
what it means to “prevent” harm focuses upon eliminating or avoiding the root
cause of the harm. Prevention in this sense would involve changing the process
unit operations, perhaps by using different feedstock or adjusting the operating
parameters, to eliminate or meaningfully reduce the benzene emissions at the
source.153
In the chemical policy setting, for example, the prevention principle provides
that preventive actions that eliminate or reduce the use of the chemical or its
inherent hazard are preferred over actions that control exposure to it.154 Preventive actions are a set of strategies, often characterized as substitution, minimization, moderation, and simplification.155 Substitution refers to the replacement of
the hazardous chemical or process with a safer substitute.156 Minimization means
adjusting the product or process design to reduce the amount of the chemical
required or performing a hazardous process (such as batch chemical production)

asbestos releases); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (defining remedial action as action taken to “prevent
or minimize the release of hazardous substances”); NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL
PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES 62–64, 66–72 (2002); PHILIPPE
SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 246 (2d ed. 2003) (describing
the preventive principle as “requiring the prevention of damage to the environment, and otherwise to reduce, limit or control activities which might cause or risk such damage”). This
includes, as we shall see below, statutes and treaties incorporating the precautionary principle.
153
J. Hirschhorn et al., Towards Prevention: The Emerging Environmental Management Paradigm, in CLEAN PRODUCTION STRATEGIES: DEVELOPING PREVENTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT IN THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY 125, 130–31 (Tim Jackson ed., 1993).
154
See KEN GEISER, CHEMICALS WITHOUT HARM: POLICIES FOR A SUSTAINABLE WORLD 94–
95 (2015); see also Malloy, Natmats, supra note 2, at 109–10. The conception of prevention
lines up well with the substitution principle found in European chemicals policy. The substitution principle as such has its origins in Sweden, having been used in occupational health and
safety legislation in 1949 and directly applied to chemical regulation as part of the 1973 Act
on Products Hazardous to Health and to the Environment. Annika Nilsson, The Precautionary
Principle in Swedish Chemicals Law and Policy, in IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE: APPROACHES FROM THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, EU AND USA 295, 305–07 (Nicolas
de Sadeleer ed., 2007) [hereinafter NORDIC COUNTRIES]. See SVEN OVE HANSSON & CHRISTINA
RUDÉN, SWEDISH CHEMS. AGENCY, REPORT NR 8/07, THE SUBSTITUTION PRINCIPLE 11 (2007)
(describing the substitution principle of one instance of inherent safety, which encompasses
substitution, moderation, minimization, and simplification). Other Nordic countries and the
EU have incorporated the substitution principle into certain aspects of chemicals policy. Ellen
Margrethe Basse, Denmark, in NORDIC COUNTRIES, supra, at 63, 65; Hans Christian Bugge,
Norway, in NORDIC COUNTRIES, supra, at 102, 112; Lofstedt, supra note 14, at 543, 545 (European Union).
155
See Malloy, Natmats, supra note 2, at 114.
156
Id.; see also HANSSON & RUDÉN, supra note 154, at 14.
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as infrequently as possible.157 Alternatively, in a moderation strategy, the chemical itself (or the product or process in which it is used) is modified to reduce the
hazards, such as by reducing the temperature at which a process operates to well
below the flashpoint for a flammable chemical used in that process.158 In simplification, processing equipment and procedures are designed in as simple a manner as possible so as to eliminate opportunities for errors. 159
Prevention has a complicated relationship with regulation in the United
States. Virtually every major federal U.S. environmental statute explicitly or implicitly acknowledges the importance of prevention as I use the term.160 Some
statutes even affirmatively embrace it.161 Yet regulators in the United States have
been generally reluctant to implement prevention as a mandatory element of their
programs.162 Risk analysis in the area of occupational health and safety is a good
example of this. Safety standard development in private and governmental settings ostensibly follows the “hierarchy of controls” approach in which risk management strategies are to be considered in a ranked order.163 As Figure 4 illustrates, 164 reduction measures, such as removing the threatening agent or
replacing it with a more benign substitute, are preferred over control strategies
designed to minimize interaction with the threat.

157

See Malloy, Natmats, supra note 2, at 114; see also HANSSON & RUDÉN, supra note 154,
at 14.
158
Malloy, Natmats, supra note 2, at 114; HANSSON & RUDÉN, supra note 154, at 14.
159
Paul Amyotte & Fotis Rigas, Applications of Process Safety Concepts to the Hydrogen
Economy, 31 CHEM. ENG’G TRANSACTIONS 31, 32 (2013); Malloy, Natmats, supra note 2, at
114; HANSSON & RUDÉN, supra note 154, at 14.
160
Malloy, Principled Prevention, supra note 12, at 114–30.
161
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13101(b) (“The Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy
of the United States that pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source whenever
feasible.”).
162
Richard J. Jackson & Timothy F. Malloy, Environmental Public Health Law: Three Pillars, 39 J.L. & MED. ETHICS 34, 35–36 (2011); Joel Tickner, Commentary: Barriers and Opportunities to Changing the Research Agenda to Support Precaution and Primary Prevention,
17 INT’L J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. & ENV’T HEALTH 163, 163–71 (2004).
163
Lyon & Popov, supra note 44, at 36; FRED A. MANUELE, ADVANCED SAFETY
MANAGEMENT 268–76 (2014).
164
Hierarchy of Controls, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: NAT’L INST. FOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (NIOSH), https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/hierarchy/
default.html [perma.cc/YZ26-FJVW] (Jan. 13, 2015).
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FIGURE 4

In practice, however, OSHA has been very reluctant to mandate elimination
or substitution.165 Rather, both in practice and in the legal literature regarding
risk analysis, prevention is typically treated as a component of voluntary private
action. For example, in the United States, the concept of pollution prevention for
industrial waste discharges and emissions took hold in the latter part of the twentieth century largely as a voluntary regime rather than a regulatory mandate.166
B. Resilience
The term “resilience” has existed for centuries, gaining a foothold in material
engineering in 1858.167 In those early years, the concept was largely limited to
describing the fairly mundane (but important) attributes of strength and ductility

165

Malloy, Principled Prevention, supra note 12, at 125–27; Cora R. Roelofs et al., Prevention Strategies in Industrial Hygiene: A Critical Literature Review, 64 AIHA J. 62, 65 (2003).
Even in Europe, where one might expect greater regulatory emphasis on prevention given its
historical roots, implementation of the principle in practice has been spotty. ANDREAS AHRENS
ET AL., HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS IN PRODUCTS AND PROCESSES: SUBSTITUTION AS AN
INNOVATIVE PROCESS 22 (2006).
166
For a comprehensive history of the development and implementation of federal and state
pollution prevention programs though the early 1990s, see Robert F. Blomquist, Government’s
Role Regarding Industrial Pollution Prevention in the United States, 29 GA. L. REV. 349, 357–
424 (1995).
167
D. E. Alexander, Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction: An Etymological Journey, 13
NAT. HAZARDS & EARTH SYS. SCIS., 2707, 2708–09 (2013); Małgorzata Pęciłło, The Concept
of Resilience in OSH Management: A Review of Approaches, 22 INT’L J. OF OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND ERGONOMICS 291, 291 (2016).
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of solid materials, such as timber or steel.168 Over time, the concept has migrated
into other disciplines—ecology, safety engineering, economics, disaster management, and organizational management—and its definitions and uses evolved. 169
One commentator identified over seventy definitions for the term.170 (See Table
5 for examples of leading definitions.)

168

Alexander, supra note 167, at 2708–10 (also noting that Sir Francis Bacon used the term
to describe certain properties of echoes in 1625); Park et al., supra note 5, at 356 (citing JOHN
C. TRAUTWINE, THE CIVIL ENGINEER’S POCKET-BOOK (1907)).
169
See Thomas G. Koslowski & Patricia H. Longstaff, Resilience Undefined: A Framework
for Interdisciplinary Communication and Application to Real-World Problems, in DISASTER
MANAGEMENT: ENABLING RESILIENCE 3, 6–13 (Anthony Masys ed., 2015); Royce Francis &
Behailu Bekera, A Metric and Frameworks for Resilience Analysis of Engineered and Infrastructure Systems, 121 RELIABILITY ENG’G & SYS. SAFETY 90, 100–102 (2014). Note that as
early as 1857, the term resiliency in the sense of the capacity to rebound from a natural disaster
was used to describe the restoration efforts of residents of the Japanese city of Shimoda in the
aftermath of a major earthquake. ROBERT TOMES, THE AMERICANS IN JAPAN: AN ABRIDGMENT
OF THE GOVERNMENT NARRATIVE OF THE U.S. EXPEDITION TO JAPAN UNDER COMMODORE
PERRY 379 (1857).
170
Len Fisher, More Than 70 Ways to Show Resilience, 518 NATURE 35 (2015). Fisher provides no support for his claim, although having been immersed in the literature I have no
reason to doubt it. That said, Dahlberg via Tierney provides more support for his claim of over
fifty definitions. See Rasmus Dahlberg, Resilience and Complexity: Conjoining the Discourses
of Two Contested Concepts, 7 CULTURE UNBOUND 541, 543 (2015) (citing KATHLEEN
TIERNEY, THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF RISK: PRODUCING DISASTERS PROMOTING RESILIENCE 162
(2014)); see also Fridolin Simon Brand & Kurt Jax, Focusing the Meaning(s) of Resilience:
Resilience as a Descriptive Concept and a Boundary Object, 12 ECOLOGY AND SOC’Y 23
(2007) (providing a typology of ten distinct categories of resilience definitions).
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TABLE 5: RESILIENCE DEFINED ACROSS DOMAINS
Author
Holling171

National Research
Council172
Hollnagel, et al.173

Society for Risk
Analysis174

United Nations175

Department of
Homeland Security176
Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission177

171

Definition
“A measure of the persistence of systems and
of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships
between populations or state variables.”
“The ability to prepare and plan for, absorb,
recover from, and more successfully adapt to
adverse events.”
“The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its
functioning prior to, during, or following
changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected
and unexpected conditions.”
“The ability of a system to reduce the initial
adverse effects (absorptive capability) of a
disruptive event (stressor) and the time/speed
and costs at which it is able to return to an
appropriate functionality/equilibrium (adaptive and restorative capability)”
“The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to, and recover from the effects
of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner,
including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and
functions”
The ability of systems, infrastructures, government, business, and citizenry to resist, absorb, recover from, or adapt to an adverse occurrence that may cause harm, destruction, or
loss of national significance
“The ability to withstand and reduce the
magnitude and/or duration of disruptive
events, which include the capability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover
from such an event.”

Domain
Ecology

Disaster Management
Safety Science
(Resilience
Engineering)
Risk Analysis

Disaster Management

Counterterrorism

Electrical Grid
Regulation

C. S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 1, 14 (1973).
172
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 14 (2012).
173
RESILIENCE ENGINEERING IN PRACTICE: A GUIDEBOOK xxxvi (Erik Hollnagel et al. eds.,
2011) [hereinafter Hollnagel (ed.), RESILIENCE ENGINEERING]; see also Erik Hollnagel, Resilience: The Challenge of the Unstable, in RESILIENCE ENGINEERING: CONCEPTS AND PRECEPTS
9, 16 (Erik Hollnagel et al. eds., 2006) (defining resilience as “the intrinsic ability of an organization (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state, which allows it to continue operations after a major mishap and/or in the presence of a continuous stress”).
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Looking at these definitions and others, two essential themes emerge. First,
broadly speaking, resilience relates to how something or someone (a physical
structure or an institution, an ecosystem or an industrial facility, a person or population) responds to shocks or disturbances. A community faces a tsunami; an
economy responds to economic sanctions; a grassland ecosystem struggles with
a drought. Second, resilience includes protective, restorative, and even transformative responses. It aims to avoid or minimize adverse impacts by resisting
or absorbing the shock while maintaining essential functions and structure. But
should adverse impacts occur, it seeks to recover from them or to adapt to
changed circumstances. However, these are general themes only. There are significant differences across and even within the various disciplines in terms of
what resilience is and how it is operationalized. Two disciplines stand out in
terms of their impact upon risk analysis and law: ecology and safety science.
Readers are familiar with the discipline of ecology. Safety science develops
“knowledge . . ., concepts, theories, principles and methods to understand, assess, communicate and manage (in a broad sense) safety.”178
In his seminal article, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, Holling
introduced the property of resilience as a means of describing ecological systems.179 He distinguished it from “stability,” meaning an ecosystem’s capacity
to remain near a stable equilibrium point. Consider the classic predator/prey relationship; the dominant paradigm in ecology was largely fixated on the system’s
ability to maintain the respective populations in equipoise. While natural variations and exogenous disturbances could disrupt the equilibrium, a stable system
would minimize the frequency and impacts of disturbance, swiftly returning the
system to equilibrium.180 Holling and others have rebranded stability over time,
referring to it as “equilibrium resilience”181 and later as “engineering resilience
(as opposed to ecological resilience).”182 For reasons that will become clear later,
I will use the original term—stability.
Holling saw resilience as a different, important property of ecosystems: the
capacity to persist—to maintain its essential structure and function––in the face
of changes or disruptions.183 The notion that a particular ecosystem could flip
174

SOC’Y FOR RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 106, at 6.
U.N. Off. for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2009).
176
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RISK STEERING COMM., DHS RISK LEXICON 26 (2010).
177
Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and Establishing
Additional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 para. 23 (2018).
178
Terje Aven, What is Safety Science?, 67 SAFETY SCIENCE 15, 18 (2014).
179
Holling, supra note 171, at 14–15.
180
Id. at 14.
181
C. S. Holling & Gary K. Meffet, Command and Control and the Pathology of Natural
Resource Management, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 328, 330 (1996) (defining stability as
“equilibrium resilience”).
182
C. S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive Cycles, in PANARCHY, supra
note 21, at 25, 27 (characterizing stability as “engineering resilience”).
183
Holling, supra note 171, at 14.
175
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from one fundamental state to another is central to resilience. A grassland consisting of various typical types of vegetation, insects, and animals can flip, sometimes relatively quickly, to a forest with a different set of animal, plant, and insect
populations and ecological functions.184 Such flips generally result from random,
sometimes extreme, natural events, such as drought or fire or from human action,
such as agricultural practices. A resilient system is one that can absorb natural or
human-induced perturbations without altering its fundamental state or that can
“bounce back” to the prior state after a flip.185 Eutrophication of shallow freshwater lakes is illustrative. In an impaired lake with low resilience, the continued
discharge of nutrients in agricultural runoff brings the lake to a tipping point,
critically reducing aquatic vegetation, oxygen content, and fish populations.
Small additional discharges can cause the collapse of the lake’s existing system
and a jump to a murky state dominated by algae.186 Cessation of runoff and reduction of nutrient levels will not, without some other intervention, return the
lake to its alternative clear, vegetated state. 187 To a great degree, then, resilience
is about thresholds––at what point will changes or disruptions of the system or
its drivers push the system over the edge into that alternative state?188
Intuitively and logically, stability and resilience appear complementary. Stability is about staying close to an equilibrium state, and resilience is about staying
away from a flipping point. At first glance, it would seem that maintaining stability should necessarily enhance resilience. If a system is close to the equilibrium point, it must be distant from the flipping point. It turns out, however, that
stability and resilience have a more complicated relationship, due in large part to
the complex nature of ecosystems. Interventions to maintain the equilibrium can
make the system brittle, decreasing its capacity to stay away from the flipping
point in the event of a major disturbance:
We call the result “the pathology of natural resource management” . . . . [A] system in which natural levels of variation have been reduced through command184

Id. at 6–10.
Not all ecosystems hover around a single equilibrium. Some are “oscillators,” naturally
shifting back and forth between two alternative equilibria. The classic example is the budworm-forest system, in which the system moves between low budworm populations and budworm outbreaks with associated changes in the populations of trees. Donald Ludwig et al.,
Sustainability, Stability, and Resilience, 1 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 7, 16–17 (1997); see also
Deepa S. Pureswaran et al., Paradigms in Eastern Spruce Budworm (Lepidoptera: Tortricidae) Population Ecology: A Century of Debate, 45 ENV’T ENTOMOLOGY 1 (2016) (discussing
a range of theories regarding the drivers of the budworm-forest dynamic).
186
BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS AND
PEOPLE IN A CHANGING WORLD 55–58 (2006); Holling, supra note 182, at 7–8.
187
Marten Scheffer et al., Dynamic Interaction of Societies and Ecosystems—Linking Theories from Ecology, Economy and Sociology, in PANARCHY, supra note 21, at 195, 198–99.
188
Lance H. Gunderson et al., Resilience of Large-Scale Resource Systems, in RESILIENCE
AND THE BEHAVIOR OF LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS 9 (Lance H. Gunderson & Lowell Pritchard Jr.
eds., 2002); WALKER & SALT, supra note 186, at 53–63; NAVIGATING SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL
SYSTEMS: BUILDING RESILIENCE FOR COMPLEXITY 5 (Fikret Berkes et al. eds., 2003) (“At a
certain level of change in conditions (threshold), the system can change very rapidly and even
catastrophically (called a flip).”).
185
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and-control activities will be less resilient than an unaltered system when subsequently faced with external perturbations, either of a natural (storms, fires, floods)
or human-induced (social or institutional) origin. We believe this principle applies
beyond ecosystems and is particularly relevant at the intersection of ecological,
social, and economic systems.189

How, then, to avoid the pathology of command and control? One clear message from this thread of resilience literature is to practice humility when intervening in complex systems.190 Expect the unexpected.191 This principle is operationalized in two practices. First, rather than attempting to directly control
system behavior and keep the system close to the desired stable state, choose
interventions that seek to enhance the system’s ecological resilience.192 Such interventions focus on building capacity to absorb shocks without losing critical
functions or to recover from losses that do occur.193 There is a fair amount of
variance among commentators regarding the specific nature of the interventions
and the metrics used to measure their effectiveness.194 That said, most formulations include interventions designed to maintain or increase monitoring/scanning
for early signs of disturbances, redundancy, substitutability and diversity of system components and functions, and optimal interconnection and communication
across system components.195 Second, implement those interventions iteratively
through adaptive management. Adaptive management is a dynamic process in
which the selected management strategy is essentially implemented as an “experiment,” testing explicit hypotheses regarding the expected response of the
system. The results of the strategy are systematically monitored and evaluated,
and the strategy is revised as necessary.196
Thus far, the discussion of resilience has focused largely on ecological resilience, namely, the resilience of complex ecosystems and coupled socio-ecological systems. Much of the theory and practice in that area is relevant to the resilience of socio-technical systems.197 However, the parallel discipline of resilience
engineering focuses squarely on the role of resilience in enhancing the safety of
189

Holling & Meffet, supra note 181, at 330.
WALKER & SALT, supra note 186, at 195; Holling & Meffet, supra note 181, at 334.
191
WALKER & SALT, supra note 186, at 198–199; Park et al., supra note 5, at 357.
192
See Holling & Meffet, supra note 181, at 334 (describing the “Golden Rule” of management: “management should facilitate existing processes and variabilities rather than changing
or controlling them.”).
193
WALKER & SALT, supra note 186, at 71–72; Jack Ahern, From Fail-Safe to Safe-to-Fail:
Sustainability and Resilience in the New Urban World, 100 LANDSCAPE AND URB. PLAN. 341,
341–43 (2011).
194
See David A. Kerner & J. Scott Thomas, Resilience Attributes of Social-Ecological Systems: Framing Metrics for Management, 3 RESOURCES 672 (2014) (providing an overview of
the wide-ranging literature).
195
See id.; WALKER & SALT, supra note 186, at 19; AMORY B. LOVINS & L. HUNTER LOVINS,
BRITTLE POWER: ENERGY STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 192–98 (2001).
196
Holling (ed.), ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 119, at 20–21; WALKER & SALT, supra,
note 186, at 128–29.
197
Adrian Smith & Andy Stirling, The Politics of Social-Ecological Resilience and Sustainable Socio-Technical Transitions, 15 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 11 (2010).
190
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technological and socio-technical systems.198 Here, think of industrial plants,
such as oil refineries or offshore drilling platforms, power plants, and infrastructure. The central thesis of resilience engineering is that:
[F]ailure, as individual failure or performance failure at the system level, represents the temporary inability to cope effectively with complexity. Success belongs
to organizations, groups and individuals who are resilient in the sense that they
recognize, adapt to, and absorb variations, changes, disturbances, disruptions, and
surprises—especially disruptions that fall outside the set of disturbances that the
system is designed to handle.199

Like ecological resilience, engineering resilience recognizes the difficulty in
managing complexity. And similar to its ecological counterpart, engineering resilience views inflexible command and control measures as counter-productive
in the face of changing circumstances and unexpected disturbances. But there are
important differences between the two schools of thought.
First, engineering resilience places more emphasis on maintaining stability
(i.e., staying close to a stable equilibrium) than on assuring resilience as Holling
uses the term (i.e., staying away from a flipping point to a new equilibrium).
Holling’s indictment of command and control efforts at maintaining stability has
reverberated through much of the resilience literature, casting stability (sometimes called reliability or robustness) as a bit of a pariah.200 This antagonism to
the pursuit of stability is also evident in the legal literature on resilience.201 The
prominence of stability in resilience engineering is understandable; safe, reliable
operation of industrial facilities and infrastructure is a central goal of safety science.202 However, this emphasis on stability does not inevitably lead to use of
198

For a brief history of resilience engineering, see Jean-Christophe Le Coze, New Models
for New Times. An Anti-Dualist Move, 59 SAFETY SCI. 200, 208–09 (2013). The term “resilience engineering” is distinct from Hollings’s “engineering resilience,” which refers to stability
in ecological and socio-ecological systems.
199
David D. Woods & Erik Hollnagel, Prologue: Resilience Engineering Concepts, in
RESILIENCE ENGINEERING: CONCEPTS AND PRECEPTS, supra note 173, at 1, 3.
200
For an example of the controversy over the respective roles of stability and ecological
resistance, see Sean D. Connell & Giulia Ghedini, Resisting Regime-Shifts: The Stabilising
Effect of Compensatory Processes, 30 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 513, 515 (2015) (arguing that stabilizing processes such as trophic compensation are understudied); Shana M.
Sundstrom et al., Letter: Resisting Resilience Theory: A Response to Connell and Ghedini, 31
TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 412 (2016) (countering that Connell and Ghedini fail to place
their work in the context of resilience as that concept is generally understood); Sean D. Connell
et al., Letter: Ecological Resistance Why Mechanisms Matter: A Reply to Sundstrom et al.,
31 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 413 (2016) (emphasizing the need to consider both processes that “limit change (i.e., resistance) and processes that adjust and recover from disturbance (i.e., resilience)”).
201
See Tracey-Lynn Humby, Law and Resilience: Mapping the Literature, 4 SEATTLE J.
ENV’T L. 85, 108 (2014) (noting that law is locked into an engineering resilience paradigm);
Ruhl, General Design, supra note 21, at 1387 (“As a general matter, however, the lesson from
resilience theory is that conditions of high variability and low predictability point in the direction of ecological resilience strategies as the default design rule.”).
202
JAMES A. KLEIN & BRUCE K. VAUGHEN, PROCESS SAFETY: PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR
SAFE AND RELIABLE OPERATIONS (2016).
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rigid command and control management of the sort condemned in ecological resilience circles. Rather, resilience engineering relies upon other means to absorb
and respond to expected and unexpected disruptions and changes to minimize
and bounce back from departures from normal operations. This leads us to the
second difference in emphasis.
Resilience engineering deals with disruption and change proactively by leveraging organizational structure, process, and culture, taking into account human
cognition and behavior.203 In other words, it aims to create the capacity (at all
levels of the organization) to identify and adjust to changing conditions in real
time, so as to reasonably maintain facility operations. While ecological resilience
theory and practice certainly considers the role of institutional capacity, the focus
on the organization and its component individuals lies at the very center of resilience engineering.204 As Table 6 illustrates, this focus is evident in the four essential capacities for resilient organizations, also known as the cornerstones of
resilience engineering: anticipation, monitoring, responding, and learning.205
TABLE 6: CORNERSTONES OF RESILIENCE ENGINEERING206

Cornerstone
Anticipation

203

Description
The capacity to anticipate expected and imagine unexpected
threats and disturbances and the willingness to devote resources to actively support anticipatory efforts.

See Kenneth A. Pettersen & Paul R. Schulman, Drift, Adaptation, Resilience and Reliability: Toward an Empirical Clarification, 117 SAFETY SCIENCE 460, 460–61 (2019) (describing
the roots of resilience engineering in organizational research); Marcelo Fabiano Costella et al.,
A Method for Assessing Health and Safety Management Systems from the Resilience Engineering Perspective, 47 SAFETY SCIENCE 1056, 1056 (2009) (tracing the origins of resilience
engineering to cognitive systems engineering); David D. Woods, Essential Characteristics of
Resilience, in RESILIENCE ENGINEERING: CONCEPTS AND PRECEPTS, supra note 173, at 21, 22–
23 (describing resilience as affected by organizational context and capacities and by actions
of individuals within the organization). Indeed, engineering resilience as typically associated
with the work of Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson has been critiqued on this very point. See
Stefan Hiermaier et al., Resilience Engineering: Chances and Challenges for a Comprehensive Concept, in HANDBOOK ON RESILIENCE OF SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS 155, 158 (Matthias
Ruth & Stefan Goessling-Reisemann eds., 2019) (arguing that classic engineering resilience
“is too generic and it focuses too much on human factors” and offering an alternative conception centered more on technology and engineering).
204
Pęciłło, supra note 167, at 294–96; Costella et al., supra note 203, at 1057.
205
Pęciłło, supra note 167, at 294; Park et al., supra note 5, at 361; Hollnagel (ed.),
RESILIENCE ENGINEERING, supra note 173, at 33. Given the recent emergence of the field, the
scope and guiding principles of resilience engineering continue to be debated, although most
commentators follow the lead of Hollnagel and his colleagues. See David Yu et al., Toward
General Principles for Resilience Engineering, 40 RISK ANALYSIS 1509, 1511–14 (2020).
206
Erik Hollnagel, The Four Cornerstones of Resilience Engineering, in 2 RESILIENCE
ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVES: PREPARATION AND RESTORATION 117, 121–29 (Christopher
Nemeth et al. eds., 2009).
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The capacity to monitor internal
and external states relying upon leading indicators and shift into a state of
readiness when conditions indicate
that a disturbance may be brewing.
The capacity to respond to regular and irregular disturbances in accordance with plans and procedures
that incorporate a range of discretion
to account for unexpected circumstances. Response includes adjustments to normal operations and activities proactively and reactively so as
to deal with emerging or occurring
disturbances.207
The capacity to adjust and normalize monitoring, anticipation, and
response in light of experience, including safety successes, near misses,
and failures.208

These cornerstones are relevant at every level of organization, from the individual worker on the floor to management at the particular facility, and the
organization as a whole. For example, at the organizational level, resilience engineering emphasizes development of a strong “safety culture,” meaning prevailing beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors establish a strong imperative for safety in
operations.209 Such a culture provides managers and workers the permission and
encouragement to implement the four cornerstones in meaningful ways. The cornerstones strike a difficult balance between flexibility and consistency. At the
individual level, managers and workers maintain awareness of shifting conditions, assessing whether adjustments to normal activities are necessary. In abnormal circumstances, those individuals would have the flexibility to depart from
default rules and procedures designed to respond to normal variations in operations.
III. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER
What then to make of all this in the context of risk analysis? This Part explores the meaningful integration of prevention and resilience into risk analysis.
In a sense, it begins at the end by considering how risk mitigation strategies
207

Park et al., supra note 5, at 361.
Pęciłło, supra note 167, at 296.
209
Yu et al., supra note 205, at 1512; Costella et al., supra note 203, at 1058; see also W.L.
Frank, Process Safety Culture in the CCPS Risk Based Process Safety Model, 26 PROCESS
SAFETY PROGRESS 203, 204 (2007) (defining safety culture).
208
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would change if policymakers were to wholeheartedly embrace prevention and
resilience. I then turn to how integration would change the architecture of risk
analysis: problem formulation, assessment, evaluation, and implementation.
Throughout this thought experiment, I use risk analysis as currently practiced as
the baseline.
A. Risk Mitigation Strategies
Part I observed that conventional risk analysis focuses on control: blocking
or reducing the interaction between the threatening agent and the vulnerable subject. As Figure 5 illustrates, integrating prevention and resilience into risk analysis drives the inclusion of several other mitigation strategies: reduction, resistance, restoration, and adaptation. This Section examines each strategy more
closely.
Before digging into these strategies in detail, a few words about scope are
useful. First, what follows primarily addresses mitigation options at the operational level—decisions made by regulators and private risk managers regarding
specific activities, processes, and products. These are the sort of undertakings
described in the three case studies. This excludes consideration of broader
measures meant to transform the fundamental structure or function of socio-technical or socio-ecological systems. Second, each of the mitigation strategies identified in Figure 5 are sometimes used in current risk analysis practice. The point
here is not that these strategies are necessarily new, but rather that they should
be considered in a systematic, integrated manner. Section III.B on the architecture of risk analysis takes this issue on directly.
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FIGURE 5: INTEGRATED RISK ANALYSIS

1. Prevention: Bringing Reduction and Resistance to Bear
Prevention includes reduction and resistance as mitigation strategies. Reduction focuses on the inherent nature of the threatening agent itself, asking
whether the agent can be removed entirely from the scenario or modified in some
way to reduce its inherent hazard. There is a tendency to equate prevention with
bans: the complete prohibition of a material, process, or activity. As Section II.A
showed, however, prevention includes much more than bans. It also considers
retaining the agent but reducing its hazard through minimization, moderation,
and simplification. So, in the pesticide case study, prevention would include not
only adoption of a safer alternative pesticide, but also use of application methods
of the pesticide that minimize amounts used. Prevention also could play a role in
the engineered microalgae case study. Rather than relying only upon containment in the cultivation pond to control interaction between the microalgae and
the natural environment, the attributes of the algae itself would be modified to
reduce its threatening nature. Existing proposals include “kill switches” in the
microalgae genome that would trigger cell death in the presence of an environmental trigger, such as temperature, or the presence of certain naturally occurring
chemicals.210
Prevention also seeks to avoid adverse consequences by building resistance.
Unlike threat reduction, which focuses upon the threating agent, resistance directs attention to the vulnerable subject. The classic example of resistance in
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Helena Čelešnik, Biosafety of Biotechnologically Important Microalgae: Intrinsic Suicide
Switch Implementation in Cyanobacterium Synechocystis sp. PCC 6803, 5 BIOLOGY OPEN
519, 519 (2016). Some commentators characterize kill switches as a form of resilience-focused
mitigation. See Gary E. Marchant & Yvonne A. Stevens, Resilience: A New Tool in the Risk
Governance Toolbox for Emerging Technologies, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 244 (2017).
Resilience-focused strategies are directed at building or triggering the threatened system’s resilient capacity rather than the inherent nature of the threatening agent.
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public health is vaccination.211 By enhancing the immunological capacity of the
individual, the vaccine diminishes the individual’s vulnerability to disease. Resistance is relevant beyond the traditional public health setting. For example, in
the pesticide case study, outreach and education programs regarding diet can help
workers and nearby residents increase their resistance to pesticide exposures.212
Facility safety can also be enhanced by building the “resistance” of the facility processes. In 2012, a major fire occurred at Chevron’s Richmond, California, oil refinery after flammable, high temperature gas oil escaped through a ruptured pipe and created a large vapor cloud.213 Administrative measures meant to
detect and respond to the increasing corrosion of the carbon steel pipe had
failed.214 Corrosion was caused by “sulfidation” of the carbon steel resulting
from the high sulfur content of the gas oil.215 The federal Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) concluded that installation of higher chromium steel piping would have minimized the vulnerability of the refinery process to corrosion and avoided the incident.216
Prevention adds value to risk analysis by mitigating the three limitations of
conventional risk analysis discussed in Section I.C: data availability, ignorance,
and indeterminacy. Regarding data availability, while prevention does not provide missing data, in certain cases it may obviate the need to obtain that data. In
the face of high data costs or intractable methodological barriers to data generation, the use of an ostensibly safer alternative that performs effectively can be
the optimal solution.217 Here again, the pesticide case is illustrative. Suppose that
a particular pesticide is suspected of causing neurological damage when inhaled
by farmworkers and bystanders but that toxicity testing for this effect would be
prohibitively costly. The pesticide formulation could be revised to include an
inert ingredient—an adjuvant—such as a surfactant, oil, or other material that
prevents or minimizes air dispersion during application or volatilization afterward.218 Assuming one is confident that the adjuvant is sufficiently effective and
the inhalation route foreclosed, the toxicity data is no longer needed.
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NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., REDUCING RISKS FOR MENTAL DISORDERS: FRONTIERS FOR
PREVENTIVE INTERVENTION RESEARCH 19 (1994).
212
See Todd P. Whitehood et al., Childhood Leukemia and Primary Prevention, 46 CURRENT
PROBS. PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 317, 344–45 (2016) (describing use of folate
supplements to reduce vulnerability to pesticide-exposure-related childhood leukemia).
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U.S. CHEM. SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BD., REPORT NO. 2012-03-I-CA, FINAL
INVESTIGATION REPORT: CHEVRON RICHMOND REFINERY PIPE RUPTURE AND FIRE 1 (2015)
[hereinafter CSB].
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Id. at 7–8.
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Id. at 5.
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Id. at 7, 47.
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Rune Hjorth et al., The Applicability of Chemical Alternatives Assessment for Engineered
Nanomaterials, 13 INTEGRATED ENV’T ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 177, 180 (2017).
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See HANS DE RUITER ET AL., WAGENINGEN UNIV. & RSCH., INFLUENCE OF ADJUVANTS AND
FORMULATIONS ON THE EMISSION OF PESTICIDES TO THE ATMOSPHERE 29–30 (2003) (analyzing
the use of adjuvants to minimize dispersion and volatilization of pesticides upon application).
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Likewise, prevention can dodge ignorance and indeterminacy by removing
or substantially reducing the threat. As a pioneer in the field of inherently safer
design of industrial facilities put it, “What you don’t have, can’t leak.”219 By
altering the threating agent or enhancing the resistance of the vulnerable subject—rather than attempting to control human behavior––prevention can minimize the impacts of indeterminacy.220 In the Richmond refinery case, Chevron
depended upon conventional inspection and maintenance procedures to manage
risk, essentially assuming away the possibility that personnel may deviate from
those procedures. The effects of indeterminacy could have been avoided by relying instead upon less vulnerable process design. Of course, assessing and implementing alternatives raises its own challenges of data availability and complexity, which is dealt with below in the discussion of necessary methodological
tools.
2. Resilience: Leveraging Resistance, Restoration, and Adaptation
Resilience relies upon resistance, restoration, and adaptation as mitigation
strategies.221 In the context of resilience thinking, resistance refers to the capacity
of vulnerable subjects to absorb the impacts of a risk that is becoming or has
become a reality.222 Resistance in this context could be a tricky concept for two
reasons. First, some perspectives on resilience would exclude resistance from the
resilience bucket because of the linkage between resistance and stability.223
However, this aversion to stability appears to be limited to strong versions of
ecological resilience; most other formulations of resilience accept the role of resistance in the broader concept of resilience.224 Second, resistance measures can
sometimes also be characterized as control measures. Take the case of constructing homes on stilts to cope with flooding risks associated with climate change.225
The stilts prevent the interaction of flood waters with the home. Does that make
stilts a control measure? On the other hand, integration of stilts into the house
design renders the structure less vulnerable to the effects of floods. Perhaps it is
better viewed as enhancing resistance. As in much of life, we can live with a bit
of gray at the margins of these concepts. The main point is that organizing potential measures into these categories of reduction, control, resistance, restoration, and adaptation helps ensure that analysts and decision-makers identify and
evaluate a full range of measures.
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Trevor Kletz, What You Don’t Have, Can’t Leak, 6 CHEM. IND., 287 (1978).
See ASHFORD ET AL., supra note 151, at IV-4–IV-5 (1993) (discussing role of primary prevention in minimizing accidents ostensibly due to “human error”).
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See SOC’Y FOR RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 106, at 6–7 (the capacity of a system to “reduce
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See supra Table 5.
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Roger Few, Flooding, Vulnerability and Coping Strategies: Local Responses to a Global
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Resilience engineering is particularly relevant to resistance-based mitigation. In that context, resistance measures optimize the capacity and flexibility of
the vulnerable subject to sense and respond to subtle shifts from normal operations to disruptions as they occur. Consider the case of the Chevron refinery
again. The use of corrosion-resistant piping discussed above is an example of
technological resistance. Organizational resilience of the sort envisioned in resilience engineering provides another complementary form of resistance. In the
Chevron example, a prior Sulfidation Failure Prevention Initiative report for the
facility had identified the threat of corrosion-related pipe failure. It recommended
more detailed inspections and/or pipe replacement throughout the facility during
the next turnaround at the plant.226 The recommendations were rejected.227 Managers concluded that deterioration of the piping did not meet rigid criteria in the
facility’s procedures for prioritizing turnaround work, despite recent work on
nearby similar piping that revealed substantial corrosion.228 This is just the sort
of inflexible command and control strategy assailed by Holling and others. Resilience engineering measures would embrace a stronger safety culture, including
policies and resources supporting more effective monitoring and anticipation of
emerging problems. For example, such policies would encourage more flexible
application of the turnaround prioritization criteria given new evidence of potential disruption from adjacent piping.229 Resistance of this sort calls for monitoring
and anticipation on the part of management and staff, using leading indicators of
performance to detect emerging variations and disturbances. Alerted to the developing problem, facility personnel also must be free to respond as needed, adjusting or even suspending operations.
Recognizing that some causal chains and potential consequences will not be
sensed or cannot be effectively absorbed, resilience also includes measures that
prepare for restoration and adaptation in the aftermath of substantial disturbance.
Restoration, or more specifically, reclamation, is a familiar concept in mining
and other extractive industries.230 Regulatory programs commonly mandate that
operators restore the disturbed land or waters to their prior condition or to some
226

CSB, supra note 213, at 8–11. A “turnaround” is an expensive, time-consuming “planned
stoppage of production for conducting a comprehensive maintenance of plants and equipment
with the purpose of restoring the processes to their original state.” Umar Al-Turki et al., Trends
in Turnaround Maintenance Planning: Literature Review, 25 J. QUALITY MAINT. ENG’G 253,
253 (2019).
227
CSB, supra note 213, at 8.
228
Id.
229
The CSB also determined that managers had failed to consider other indicators of corrosion problem and that once the initial leak that led to the rupture was identified, workers and
first line workers were reluctant to shut down the unit. CSB, supra note 213, at 11.
230
Amy Yeldell & Victor R. Squires, Restoration, Reclamation, Remediation and Rehabilitation of Mining Sites: Which Path Do We Take Through the Regulatory Maze?, in
ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION: GLOBAL CHALLENGES, SOCIAL ASPECTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
BENEFITS 37, 51 (Victor R. Squires ed., 2016); Anna T. Lima et al., The Legacy of Surface
Mining: Remediation, Restoration, Reclamation and Rehabilitation, 66 ENV’T SCIENCE &
POL’Y 227, 228–29 (2016).
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other beneficial use upon completion of activities.231 That obligation is often secured through financial assurance mechanisms, such as bonds or insurance.232
Such programs do not involve risk analysis as this Article uses the term though;
the damage addressed through that sort of restoration is expected.
The concept of restoration is likewise well developed in the ecological resilience literature dealing with natural resources management.233 Ecological restoration—defined as “the process of assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that
has been degraded, damaged or destroyed”234—has grown rapidly over the last
twenty-five years.235 It has found its way into the legal literature regarding various aspects of natural resources management, including habitat management,
forest management, and water quality.236 Such programs tend to be reactive and
ad hoc rather than proactive; that is, they respond to problems after the fact. In a
risk analysis context, restoration would be one of several mitigation measures
systematically considered at the front end of the decision process.
Restoration for these purposes aims to repair the harms that do occur—to
deal with the adverse consequences that ultimately could not be avoided through
threat reduction, control, or resistance. The concept is broad, including immediate emergency response measures as well as longer term remedial efforts.237 Restoration in the form of emergency response is prevalent in the realm of facility
safety.238 There, various regulatory programs require extensive emergency planning for disturbances and disasters, both in terms of design and operation of facilities.239 Restoration efforts beyond immediate response are generally left out
of risk analysis, left to other programs and institutions that may be largely
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disconnected from the risk analysis process.240 Think back to the case of synthetic algae production, which potentially could result in damage to natural ecosystems in the event of a release. MCANs submitted to the EPA seeking approval
for such activities must describe how the algae production and use will be monitored and must set out emergency termination and containment procedures.241
However, applicants are not required to include restoration planning and implementation procedures in the MCAN.
The final mitigation strategy—adaptation—is a core element of resilience.
Like restoration, it acknowledges that risks sometimes become realities.242 Adaptation leverages the capacity of a system to change in light of events and experience.243 Notice in Figure 5 that adaptation can operate at two levels. First, at
the system level, the impacted agent—the facility, ecosystem, or human population—may change aspects of its essential structure or functioning in the face of
the disturbance. This sort of fundamental shift is difficult to plan for; perhaps the
most that can be done ex ante is to establish the capacity and resources for the
subject to identify and implement fundamental change, whatever that may look
like, in the future. The second form of adaption is more relevant to risk analysis
as we have discussed it above. This type of adaptation focuses on adjusting the
originally deployed mitigation measures in light of experience. Risk analysis approaches grounded in ecological resilience would call this adaptive management.244 As noted above, the existing legal literature explores the nature, value,
and limitations of adaptive management extensively.245 For our purposes, it is
sufficient to note that adaptation involves reconsideration of the full set of mitigation measures based on monitoring of their implementation—it is not limited
to modifying a resilience-based mitigation measure. So, for example, if monitoring and experience indicate that a selected prevention, control, or resistance
measure is failing, adaptation may adjust that measure or replace it altogether
with new measures, depending upon the circumstances.
In the realm of engineering resilience in particular, adaptation operates at the
individual level in the moment and at the organizational level. By way of example, recall that resistance occurs when workers observe variances in operations
and respond by departing from established default procedures or by developing
new strategies for unforeseen threats on the fly.246 Adaptation occurs when individuals incorporate those responses into their normal repertoire, when they learn
240

But see Subpart F - Releases from Solid Waste Management Units, 40 C.F.R. § 264.100
(2016) (establishing corrective action program prospectively requiring cleanup of future releases of contaminants at hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities).
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242
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Erik Hollnagel & Yushi Fujita, The Fukushima Disaster – Systemic Failures as the Lack
of Resilience, 45 NUCLEAR ENG’G & TECH. 13, 13–14 (2013).
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from the experience.247 Similarly, at the organization level, adaptation occurs
when the facility revises standard procedures and standards based on what it has
learned from accidents, near misses, or success stories, including adopting (and
thus normalizing) adaptive responses by individual workers.248
Thus, through resistance, restoration, and adaptation, resilience both accepts
and responds to complexity, ignorance, and indeterminacy. Accepting that some
interactions and consequences cannot be predicted or controlled well in advance,
resilience instead develops greater capacity to identify disturbances as they approach and respond closer in time. It provides resistance strategies that reduce
vulnerability and emphasize nimble, timely adjustments to dynamic, largely unpredictable conditions. Through restoration strategies, resilience builds capacity
to rebuild the damaged subject. And at the meta-level, resilience relies upon
adaptive strategies, using experience to adjust or replace previously selected mitigation measures.249 Ultimately, resilience counters the surprises flowing from
complexity, ignorance, and indeterminacy by moving from rigid fail-safe approaches characteristic of a control-oriented strategy to a “safe-to-fail” approach.250
B. Changing the Architecture of Risk Analysis in Practice
This Section turns to the “what if” question—how would risk analysis look
if it fully embraced prevention and resilience thinking? To answer that question,
we turn to the four elements of risk analysis set out in Table 2: problem formulation, assessment, evaluation/selection, and implementation. Earlier, I warned
that risk analysis is not nearly as linear a process as Table 2 suggests. Rather,
each element of risk analysis builds toward the ultimate decision regarding how
to manage risk, if at all. Consider problem formulation. It is not simply focused
on the nature of the baseline threat or the likelihood and severity of impacts if
left unmitigated. Problem formulation is contextual; it defines the issue to include how risk would be altered under potential risk mitigation scenarios.251 The
menu of potential risk mitigation strategies to be considered also drives the nature and scope of the assessment element. But we have to start somewhere. In
this Section, I walk through each element in sequence, drawing cross-connections as we go. Table 7 provides a roadmap, identifying in italics the major
changes needed to integrate prevention and resilience.
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TABLE 7: THE INTEGRATED ARCHITECTURE OF RISK ANALYSIS
Elements
Problem Formulation

Assessment
Evaluation/Selection

Implementation

Functional Components
Problem definition
Include identification of “irregular threats” and
“unexamined events”
Identification of potential mitigation options
Include prevention, resistance, restoration, and
adaptation measures
Risk assessment
Expand vulnerability assessment
Include alternatives assessment
Evaluation and selection of potential risk mitigation measures
Include prevention, resistance, restoration, and
adaptation measures
Engage in systematic trade-off analysis of
measures
Implementation of risk mitigation measures
Monitor/Evaluate implementation
Revise risk mitigation measures

1. Problem Formulation
Problem formulation is critical because it sets the boundaries of the risk analysis along two dimensions: the threats or problems to be assessed and the mitigation measures to be evaluated.252 Integration of prevention and resilience requires changes relevant to each of these dimensions.
First, consider the range of threats captured by conventional problem formulation. At the end of the day, risk analysis is meant to support rigorous, timely
decision-making. Therefore, it must balance the goal of being comprehensive
against the need to be efficient and expeditious. In striking that balance, problem
formulation in conventional risk analysis tends to drop certain categories of
threats from further consideration. Problem formulation is very good at identifying standard risks and issues, what Westrum calls “regular” threats.253 It is less
attentive to Westrum’s “irregular threats” and “unexampled events.” Irregular
threats are low-probability events that carry high consequences if they do occur.254 We know that they can happen, but drop them from further consideration
because their likelihood is deemed negligible based on historical data or expert
subjective belief.255 For example, in performing a process hazard analysis, the
252
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Ron Westrum, A Typology of Resilience Situations, in RESILIENCE ENGINEERING:
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255
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review team excludes a total power loss from the scenarios it assesses because,
in the team’s experience, such an event is not credible.256 Or, in evaluating use
of synthetic algae for biofuel production, the EPA restricts the risks it considers
to those associated with “reasonably foreseen” conditions of use.257 Unexampled
threats are the unknown unknowns that are exceedingly difficult to imagine.258
Such threats are obscured by the sort of ignorance discussed in Section I.C.2.
And not surprisingly, unexampled events are not typically included in the definition of the problem in conventional risk analysis.259
Prevention and resilience strategies can help to avoid or minimize irregular
and unexampled events, but only if such events are included in the scope of the
identified problem.260 Including an irregular event in the problem definition is
straightforward enough—just do not drop it from further evaluation. Of course,
retaining irregular threats is not costless; resource and time constraints undoubtedly constrain our capacity to address every eventuality comprehensively.261
That said, we must recognize that prevention-based and resilience-based mitigation options may offer cost-effective opportunities to blunt some irregular
threats. The trick will be finding the right balance in what to retain and what to
jettison during problem formulation.
Unexampled events are more troublesome; how does an analyst include an
unknown threat in the problem scope? Two approaches can enhance problem
formulation here. The first is to focus on consequences in addition to causes.
Much of existing problem formulation relies upon our knowledge about whether
SAFETY 83, 84–85 (2015); Elisabeth Pate-Cornell, On “Black Swans” and “Perfect Storms”:
Risk Analysis and Management When Statistics Are Not Enough, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 1823,
1824–25 (2012); John F. Murphy & Jim Conner, Beware of the Black Swan: The Limitations
of Risk Analysis for Predicting the Extreme Impact of Rare Process Safety Incidents, 31
PROCESS SAFETY PROGRESS 330, 331 (2012).
256
Murphy & Conner, supra note 255, at 331.
257
15 U.S.C. § 2602(4) and § 2604(a)(2)(D). The EPA defines reasonably foreseen conditions
of use as “future circumstances, distinct from known or intended conditions of use, under
which the Administrator expects the MCAN microorganism to be manufactured, processed,
distributed, used, or disposed of.” Env’t Prot. Agency, supra note 139, at 1 n.1.
258
Westrum, supra note 253, at 57–58. Such unexampled events fall within the ambit of “deep
uncertainty.” See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN THE
FACE OF UNCERTAINTY 38 (2013) [hereinafter INST. OF MED., ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS]
(defining deep uncertainty as “uncertainty about the fundamental processes or assumptions
underlying a risk assessment”).
259
Pate-Cornell, supra note 255, at 1824–25. Of course, in any given case, the categorization
of an event as irregular versus unexampled is open to dispute. Take the case of the Fukushima
disaster in which an earthquake and subsequent forty-foot-high tsunami devastated the Tokyo
Electrical Power Company’s nuclear facility at Fukushima. Hollnagel and co-author concluded that the Fukushima disaster clearly was an unexampled event, while Pate-Cornell classified it as an irregular event. Compare id. with Hollnagel & Fujita, supra note 246, at 16.
260
See Murphy & Conner, supra note 255, at 331 (noting that risk analysis tools in facility
safety “cannot estimate the risk of hazard scenarios that have not been identified”).
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See Hollnagel & Fujita, supra note 246, at 17 (“It is not very difficult to find a very large
number of potential risks or threats, but there may be insufficient time and resources – or even
motivation – to do so, and to evaluate them thoroughly. The anticipation is therefore constrained, often by referring to shared assumptions about what is likely and what is not.”).
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and how a given threatening agent could lead to problems. For example, in considering whether a particular chemical process could lead to an explosion or fire,
conventional problem formulation may look to historical industry experience or
engineering assessments based on standard assumptions and models.262 Where
complexity creates ignorance or indeterminacy undermines assumptions regarding human behavior, the limits of our knowledge can hamper adequate problem
formulation. In such cases, problem formulation can be supplemented by focusing on potential consequences of concern—explosions, fish kills, horizontal gene
transfer from synthetic organisms, and so on—without regard to the pathway.
We can envision the event and its severe impact even when the path leading to it
remains murky.263 (Although skeptical readers may be concerned about the possible costs involved in protecting against such events, keep in mind that we are
focused here on problem formulation; that is, what things should we consider in
the next steps of risk analysis. In other words, we are simply keeping these consequences––and their associated “shadow” unexampled events––on the table,
not concluding that mitigation measures should be taken.)
The second approach calls for bringing greater imagination and broader participation from stakeholders and experts to bear on problem formulation. Unexampled events seen as unimaginable before a tragedy are often characterized as
predictable after the fact.264 This is so because reviewing an event and its consequences in retrospect can reveal causal pathways and interdependencies that
were difficult to see beforehand. Often, this occurs when multiple predictable
events converge in unusual ways; think here of the so-called “perfect storm.”265
Various strategies can assist analysts in identifying unexampled events for further assessment.266 Two in particular stand out. First, analysts can identify consequences of concern and then work backwards from there to brainstorm a range
of situations from which such consequences could flow, even if those situations
seem improbable.267 This strategy differs from the approach described in the paragraph above, which focuses on consequences without regard to casual pathways, in that this strategy does ultimately seek to identify the initiating events
and pathways. Second, analysts could engage more broadly in the generation of
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scenarios,268 defined as a “set of events that could, within reason, take place.”269
In particular, exploratory scenario generation uses a mix of knowledge, experience, and imagination in the face of ignorance to envision elusive causal pathways and their outcomes.270 There is a broad range of quantitative and qualitative
scenario generation tools and methods; some rely more heavily on broad stakeholder participation, while others focus on expert input.271 The goal in exploratory scenario development is not to predict what is likely to occur, but rather to
pinpoint what is plausible.272 Plausible unexampled events uncovered through
scenario generation would be held over for subsequent assessment.273
Recall that in addition to framing the problems to be addressed, existing best
practice in problem formulation also calls for identifying potential solutions.274
Given that the focus on control is so central to conventional risk analysis, prevention-based and resilience-based are not typically identified as alternative options. Integration of prevention and resilience into risk analysis thus would require expanding problem formulation practice to include a broader range of
mitigation options. This provides prevention and resilience with a place at the
table as assessment and evaluation move forward. Take the case of pesticide registration. In addition to control options (such as limits on when and how to apply
the pesticide or personal protective equipment mandates for workers), problem
formulation might also cite less-toxic alternative pesticides or modified agricultural practices as potential mitigation options.275
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(Zwaar Water ed., 2005) (defining scenarios as “coherent descriptions of alternative hypothetical futures that reflect different perspectives on past, present, and future developments, which
can serve as a basis for action”).
270
Graeme A. Riddell et al., Tomorrow’s Disasters – Embedding Foresight Principles into
Disaster Risk Assessment and Treatment, 45 INT’L J. DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 1, 3 (2020).
271
Id.; H.R. Maier et al., An Uncertain Future, Deep Uncertainty, Scenarios, Robustness and
Adaptation: How Do They Fit Together?, 81 ENV’T MODELLING & SOFTWARE 154, 157 (2016).
272
INST. OF MED., ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS, supra note 258, at 241; Raybould, supra note
268, at 125–26.
273
Riddell et al., supra note 270, at 3–4; Raybould, supra note 268, at 125–26.
274
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SILVER BOOK, supra note 28, at 11–12.
275
In 2017, a California appellate court held that the evaluation process for pesticides must
include “consideration of feasible alternatives.” Pesticide Action Network N. Am. v. Dep’t of
Pesticide Regul., 16 Cal. App. 5th 224, 245–47 (2017). The Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) issued a directive implementing this requirement in 2019. 2018-26 Cal. Regulatory
Notice Reg. 1–3 (May 1, 2019), https://www.cdpr.ca.gov/docs/registration/canot/2018/ca201
8-26.pdf [perma.cc/EW8B-FJLK].
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2. Assessment
Discussions of the assessment element of risk analysis usually focus on risk
assessment. As Section I.B explains, risk assessment consists of four basic steps:
characterization of the threat, assessment of the interaction between the threat
and the affected subject, assessment of the subject’s vulnerability, and characterization of the consequences.276 Integration of prevention and resilience entails
two revisions to current practice: (1) expansion of vulnerability assessment to
explicitly judge the baseline resilience of the affected subject277 and (2) addition
of alternatives assessment to systematically identify and measure the trade-offs
presented by mitigation options, including prevention-based and resilience-based
options.
To varying degrees, current approaches to vulnerability assessment implicitly take into account the resilience of the affected subject. For example, risk
assessment for pesticide registration includes dose-response assessment, which
identifies the level of exposure a person can handle without experiencing adverse
health impacts. In other words, dose-response assessment measures the capacity
of individuals to resist toxic effects of the pesticide; the capacity to resist a disruptive event is an attribute of resilience. Framing dose-response assessment
more explicitly as an assessment of resilience centers attention more clearly on
the affected individual, rather than on the threatening agent. This emphasizes the
need to scrutinize how the individual’s physiological functions and physical/social environment influence that individual’s resilience.
The failure of California’s pesticide program to scrutinize cumulative exposures illustrates this point. DPR evaluates pesticide active ingredients individually, so dose-response assessment assumes that workers and bystanders are exposed just to the active ingredient under review.278 In the real world, individuals
are exposed to mixtures of active ingredients. This affects the individual’s capacity to resist the toxic insult for the pesticides. For example, substances such
as glutathione, a naturally occurring antioxidant central to detoxifying certain
toxins in mammals, can be depleted by one pesticide, making it harder for the
body to resist the other pesticide.279 An individual’s or population’s resilience in
the face of pesticide exposure can of course be affected by other factors as well,
including reduced resistance in sensitive sub-populations, such as children or the
elderly,280 and exposure to other chemical or non-chemical stressors, such as
276

See supra Figure 2. Depending upon the regulatory context, these steps go by different
names. See supra Table 3.
277
Francis & Bekera, supra note 169, at 92.
278
VIRGINIA ZAUNBRECHER ET AL., UCLA SUSTAINABLE TECH. & POL’ Y PROGRAM, EXPOSURE
AND INTERACTION: THE POTENTIAL HEALTH IMPACTS OF USING MULTIPLE PESTICIDES 4–5
(2016).
279
Id. at 12–13.
280
See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ASSESSING THE HUMAN HEALTH RISKS
OF TRICHLOROETHYLENE: KEY SCIENTIFIC ISSUES 323 (2006) (noting that toxicologic and epidemiologic data “rarely provide” sufficient information regarding effects on “potentially susceptible subpopulations, such as children [and] the infirm”).
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physical stress and psychosocial stress (e.g., community violence, unemployment).281 Thus, meaningful integration of the concept of resilience into vulnerability assessment requires substantially more attention to cumulative impacts
broadly defined. Identification of specific methods for cumulative impact assessment is beyond the scope of this Article. It is perhaps enough to note that although this area is not nearly as developed as conventional assessment, a wide
range of cumulative assessment frameworks, methods, and tools are available.282
Socio-technical systems (such as industrial facilities and the electrical grid)
and natural ecosystems also face vulnerabilities. Understanding such vulnerabilities likewise requires integration of the relevant system’s resilience. What is the
baseline capacity of a natural gas power plant to resist and recover from a terrorist attack or, as in the case of Fukushima, the combination of an earthquake and
tsunami? To what extent could a lake recover from invasion by a highly competitive synthetic algae strain? Risk assessment embracing a resilience perspective
must be able to address such questions, but there are no well-established methods
for actually measuring the resilience of socio-technical or natural systems.283
There is progress along this front, however. As with cumulative assessment, a
wide array of frameworks, methods, and tools for assessing the resilience capacity are available in various domains,284 including, among others,

281

Richard Todd Niemeier et al., A Cumulative Risk Perspective for Occupational Health and
Safety (OHS) Professionals, 17 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 6342, 6344, 6349 (2020)
(noting the presence of “emerging scientific evidence that chronic psychosocial stress may
make individuals more susceptible to health effects from physical and chemical exposures”).
282
See Simon John More et al., Guidance on Harmonised Methodologies for Human Health,
Animal Health and Ecological Risk Assessment of Combined Exposure to Multiple Chemicals,
17 EFSA J. 1, 16–18 (providing an overview of existing regulatory approaches to cumulative
impact assessment). See generally CHEMICAL MIXTURES AND COMBINED CHEMICAL AND
NONCHEMICAL STRESSORS: EXPOSURE, TOXICITY, ANALYSIS, AND RISK (Cynthia V. Rider &
Jane Ellen Simmons eds., 2018); Margaret M. MacDonell et al., Cumulative Risk Assessment
Toolbox: Methods and Approaches for the Practitioner, 2013 J. TOXICOLOGY 1 (2013); Hans
Løkke et al., Tools and Perspectives for Assessing Chemical Mixtures and Multiple Stressors,
313 TOXICOLOGY 73 (2013).
283
See Stuart L. Pimm et al., Measuring Resilience is Essential If We Are to Understand It, 2
NAT. SUSTAIN. 895, 895–96 (2019) (noting the continued difficulty in “operationalizing resilience”); Igor Linkov et al., Measurable Resilience for Actionable Policy, 47 ENV’T SCI. &
TECH. 10108, 10108 (2013) (“[T]he failure to understand resilience in the context of these
complex systems has precluded the creation of an actionable metrics framework to inform
resilience decisions.”).
284
See Aven, supra note 263, at 537 (surveying methods and metrics for assessing resilience).

22 NEV. L.J. 145

Fall 2021]

RE-IMAGINING RISK

199

infrastructure,285 industrial facility safety,286 and socio-ecological systems.287
Developing and validating methods fit for use in the various regulatory programs
will entail significant effort.
Expansion of vulnerability assessment builds off an existing aspect of risk
assessment. Integrating prevention and resilience into risk analysis will also require the addition of a largely distinct form of assessment—alternatives assessment. First, a bit a background for context. In conventional risk analysis, the risk
assessment would typically characterize the risk associated with the threat under
review and the relative risk reductions flowing from candidate risk control options identified during problem formulation. For example, during registration of
a methyl iodide (MI), a fumigant used to kill pests affecting strawberries, DPR’s
risk assessment characterized certain risks of MI use—carcinogenicity and neurotoxicity—and predicted the reduction in those risks expected from control
measures such as buffer zones, personal protective equipment, and so on.288
While such an assessment requires sophisticated methods and expertise, it is relatively straightforward because it essentially involves one comparison across one
attribute—risk presented by the unmitigated and mitigated use of the pesticide.
Now assume that prevention-based and resilience-based measures were included in the slate of mitigation options considered, things like potentially less
toxic chemical alternatives, steam treatment of strawberry fields, and solarization
of the fields.289 Meaningful assessment of the proposed pesticide and the alternatives now requires comparison across a range of sometimes incommensurable
attributes. For example, does the non-carcinogenic chemical alternative nonetheless present risk of endocrine disruption or respiratory toxicity? Does steam treatment increase the risk of serious worker injury? How well does solarization work
as compared to MI application in terms of eliminating pests? Some type of broadbased comparative assessment is needed to lay out the relative benefits and pitfalls presented by the baseline material, chemical, or activity and its alternatives.290
285

See Warner et al., supra note 24, at 107–08 (use of network analysis to quantify the resilience of railway infrastructure); Francis & Bekera, supra note 169, at 95–97 (proposing “a
resilience metric that incorporates the three resilience capabilities [absorptive, adaptive, and
restorative] and the time to recovery”).
286
See Steen & Aven, supra note 24, at 294–97 (extended risk assessment); G.H.A. Shirali et
al., Assessing Resilience Engineering Based on Safety Culture and Managerial Factors, 31
PROCESS SAFETY PROGRESS 17, 17 (2012).
287
Peter Weißhuhn et al., Ecosystem Vulnerability Review: Proposal of an Interdisciplinary
Ecosystem Assessment Approach, 61 ENV’T MGMT. 904, 904–05 (2018); Samuel S. Mamauag
et al., A Framework for Vulnerability Assessment of Coastal Fisheries Ecosystems to Climate
Change—Tool for Understanding Resilience of Fisheries (VA—TURF), 147 FISHERIES RSCH.
381, 381–82 (2013).
288
Notice of Final Decisions to Register Pesticide Products Containing Methyl Iodide and
Written Evaluation, Vol. 2010-50, Cal. Dept. of Pesticide Regul. (Dec. 1, 2010).
289
FROINES ET AL., supra note 99, at 12.
290
See Malloy, Principled Prevention, supra note 12, at 140–44 (exploring the value of comparative assessment in prevention-based regulation); MARY O’BRIEN, MAKING BETTER
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Risk assessment as currently practiced does not typically address such issues, primarily because “on the ground” risk analysis does not generally give
meaningful attention to prevention-based and resilience-based options. That is
not to say that risk managers engaging in conventional risk analysis would ignore
considerations such as the relative cost and efficacy of control options in choosing among control-based mitigation measures. Rather, just that broader inclusion
of prevention-based and resilience-based options renders the comparative assessment more complex.
Comparative assessment methods of this sort are available; they go by different names in different domains.291 For example, alternatives assessment has
developed extensively in the chemicals area,292 with roots in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Design for the Environment program.293 Alternatives assessment (AA) is a method for systematically identifying and comparing
potentially safer alternatives to materials, processes, or activities on the basis of
their hazards, performance, and economic viability.294 Likewise, forms of comparative assessment have been developed for application in the facility safety
area to assist in consideration of prevention- and resilience-based measures.295
The particulars of the comparative assessment method will vary depending
upon the decision context. As a general matter, though, any such method will

ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO RISK ASSESSMENT 191–202 (2000) (describing the essential features of alternatives assessment, broadly defined).
291
O’BRIEN, supra note 290, at 147–69 (surveying forms of comparative assessment used in
a variety of settings, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species
Act, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer).
292
See generally NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE
SELECTION OF CHEMICAL ALTERNATIVES (2014) (providing guidance on methods for chemicals alternatives assessment).
293
Timothy Malloy et al., Decisions, Science, and Values: Crafting Regulatory Alternatives
Analysis, 35 RISK ANALYSIS 2137, 2140 (2015) [hereinafter Malloy et al., Decisions, Science,
and Values]; Emma T. Lavoie et al., Chemical Alternatives Assessment: Enabling Substitution
to Safer Chemicals, 44 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 9244, 9244–46 (2010). In a growing number of
jurisdictions, including California and the European Union, manufacturers of certain chemicals of high concern are required to engage in AA. Christian Beaudrie et al., Evaluating the
Application of Decision Analysis Methods in Simulated Alternatives Assessment Case Studies:
Potential Benefits and Challenges of Using MCDA, 17 INTEGRATED ENV’T ASSESSMENT &
MGMT. 27, 28 (2021).
294
Molly M. Jacobs et al., Alternatives Assessment Frameworks: Research Needs for the Informed Substitution of Hazardous Chemicals, 124 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 265, 265–67 (2016);
O’BRIEN, supra note 290, at 191–202 (describing the essential features of alternatives assessment).
295
See, e.g., Faisal I. Khan & Paul R. Amyotte, I2SI: A Comprehensive Quantitative Tool for
Inherent Safety and Cost Evaluation, 18 J. LOSS PREVENTION PROCESS INDUS. 310, 312–20
(2005) (describing a method for assessment of potentially inherently safer processes); Lars
Koch & Nicholas A. Ashford, Rethinking the Role of Information in Chemicals Policy: Implications for TSCA and REACH, 14 J. CLEANER PROD. 31, 36–37 (2006) (discussing Technology
Options Analysis).
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include at least three key steps.296 First, the assessor must identify the potential
slate of mitigation measures. (Much of this would occur during problem formulation.) 297 Second, key criteria against which the alternatives are compared must
be selected. For example, in the chemicals area the criteria typically cover five
major areas: physical chemical hazards (i.e., explosivity and flammability), human health impacts, environmental and ecological impacts, technical feasibility,
and economic feasibility.298 Last, the assessor must collect and compile data regarding how well each alternative performs with respect to each criterion.299 The
results of the comparative assessment are often presented in a performance matrix, allowing for visual inspection of disaggregated data to easily identify tradeoffs presented by the alternatives.300
3. Evaluation
The evaluation element, sometimes called “risk management” step,301 involves appraisal of the trade-offs presented by the slate of candidate mitigation
measures, culminating in selection of a preferred option. Regulators and regulated entities face choices among mitigation measures in a wide range of settings,302 including approving uses of toxic substances and pesticides, choosing
Superfund remedies,303 and selecting worker protection measures.304 Much has

296

Jacobs et al., supra note 294, at 275–78. Some comparative assessment methods may also
include a fourth step: evaluation of the relevant trade-offs among the alternatives, culminating
in the selection of an alternative, if appropriate. Id. at 275. This sort of trade-off analysis is
discussed in Section II.B.3 (Evaluation), below. Renn and Klinke consider all of these steps
as part of evaluation. See Renn & Klinke, supra note 24, at 17, 19.
297
In the chemicals and pesticides area, prevention alternatives may include drop‐in chemical
substitutes or product/process redesign, which eliminates the need for a chemical. Joel A.
Tickner et al., Advancing Safer Alternatives Through Functional Substitution, 49 ENV’T SCI.
& TECH. 742, 743–44 (2015).
298
Jacobs et al., supra note 294, at 267.
299
Malloy et al., Decisions, Science, and Values, supra note 293, at 2140. This step draws
upon a variety of methods, tools, and disciplines. Depending on the focus of the criteria, resources, and availability, the data may be observational, experimentally derived, or predicted.
Ziye Zheng et al., Combining in Silico Tools with Multicriteria Analysis for Alternatives Assessment of Hazardous Chemicals: A Case Study of Decabromodiphenyl Ether Alternatives,
53 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 6341, 6342 (2019).
300
Malloy et al., Decisions, Science, and Values, supra note 293, at 2141.
301
See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SILVER BOOK, supra note 28, at 241–43 (“Risk management
involves choosing among the options after the appropriate assessments have been undertaken
and evaluated.”).
302
Malloy et al., Decisions, Science, and Values, supra note 293, at 2147.
303
See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (2020) (setting out remedy selection process for hazardous site
cleanup under Superfund).
304
See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918, 1926 (2020) (describing the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration’s evaluation of a variety of engineering controls and work practices
in light of technical feasibility, economic impact, and risk reduction to establish permissible
exposure limits).
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been written about how to structure the evaluation process.305 In practice, there
is typically little in terms of specific regulatory standards or guidance regarding
how the agency makes the decision. Consider the new chemical review process
for synthetic algae. The EPA provides much guidance regarding how to conduct
the risk assessment but virtually no formal direction about how to choose mitigation measures.306 Likewise, the OSHA Process Safety Management regulations offer no standards for how to select among viable mitigation measures.307
The story for pesticide approval in California is somewhat better; DPR guidance
articulates a general standard for selection among mitigation measures and explicitly acknowledges the subjective nature of such value-based judgements.308
That said, DPR does not establish a systematic evaluative process to guide the
decision-making or keep subjectivity within bounds.
The evaluation process can be difficult when considering a set of controlbased options. For example, mandating that a volatile pesticide be mixed into the
soil may reduce the risks of airborne drift to neighboring homes more cheaply
than tarping the field but could increase the risk to groundwater.309 The tradeoffs can be thorny, and the decision-maker must be careful to not replace one
risk with another potentially worse risk.310 Incorporating prevention- and resilience-based options can exacerbate the complexity of the decision-making, particularly because such options may expand the set of criteria to be considered in
comparing options. Most control options are “add-on” technologies that impact
neither the basic technology used by the regulated entity nor the entity’s organizational structure or norms.311 Prevention-based options (such as substitution of
materials and process changes) and resilience-based measures (including adoption of safety culture practices) can require reconsideration of core business operations. Consider the case of pesticide application. It is one thing to choose between personal protective equipment for workers versus use of tarps to control
occupational exposure. It is quite another to evaluate whether the trade-offs in
efficacy and cost presented by an alternative, safer pesticide is warranted, or
whether substantial changes to a grower’s established agricultural practices are
preferrable to using the toxic pesticide.

305

NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SILVER BOOK, supra note 28, at 249–51; PCCRARM, supra note
28, at 29–39.
306
See supra Section I.B.3.
307
See supra pp. 15–17.
308
DPR, GUIDE, supra note 46, at 52 (Regulators are to “select a risk-reduction strategy of
integrated measures that are scientifically sound and cost-effective, and that reduce or prevent
risks while taking into account social, cultural, ethical political and legal considerations.”) and
54 (“The process is necessarily subjective in that it requires value judgments on safety margins
and the reasonableness of control measures.”).
309
Id. at 54.
310
See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risk of Risk Management, 9 RISK:
HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 39, 40 (1998) (“Interventions may reduce ‘target risks’ but may
also increase ‘countervailing risks.’ ”).
311
See supra pp. 13–14.
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How then to select from the slate of mitigation measures? The literature does
not offer much in the way of guidance. Few commentators explicitly confront
the role of prevention-based and resilience-based measures as forms of risk mitigation. Those that do tend to leave the evaluation process somewhat open, acknowledging the value of context-specific evaluation without specifically elaborating on how it would be done.312 There is a tendency to essentially allocate
control, prevention, and resilience mitigation strategies to different default contexts. Recall that conventional risk analysis is hindered in three contexts: where
important data is unavailable, where substantial complexity or ignorance is present, and where indeterminacy exists.313 Marchant and Stevens reserve resilience-based measures primarily for dealing with complexity and ignorance.314
Renn and Klinke suggest that prevention is best suited to situations of “intolerable risk”—meaning situations in which likely catastrophic impacts outweigh any
potential benefits.315 In the face of complexity, they recommend adoption of
“adaptive” resilience-based measures, namely, monitoring and evaluation of outcomes.316 For data unavailability, which they categorize as a form of uncertainty,
Renn and Klinke call for “coping” resilience-based measures such as monitoring,
emergency preparedness, and diversification of protective measures.317
No doubt that the “sorting hat” function of such categories highlights some
particular strengths of the different types of mitigation measures. It can also help
simplify the evaluation and selection process. But too much categorical thinking
can generate unjustified silos, obscuring the broader benefits of prevention-based
and resilience-based measures and discouraging integrated use of multiple
measures. As I discuss in Sections III.A.1 and 2, prevention and resilience are
not as limited in value as a categorical approach suggests; they can both be

312

See Marchant & Stevens, supra note 6, at 245 (“Each of the . . . governance approaches
will have some relevance for any risk management decision, with the relative weight given to
any particular tool in a given context dependent on the strengths and weaknesses of each of
the other three approaches and the reinforcement of the four methods upon each other.”); Renn
& Klinke, supra note 24, at 14, 19–20 (observing that the evaluation process “can be described
in terms of classical decision theory” and citing other works that lay out a systematic framework for selecting among risk management options).
313
See supra Section I.C.
314
Marchant & Stevens, supra note 6, at 247–48 (“[R]esilience is best suited for more complex systems that have the potential to create unanticipated or sudden surprises that were not
foreseeable or preventable ex ante.”). Marchant and Stevens do not discuss the role of prevention as defined in this Article, apparently conflating prevention-based options with conventional control-based approaches. See id. at 247 (“[R]esilience is different from, but complementary to, traditional ex ante risk assessment and risk management approaches for avoiding
or preventing harm, which are well entrenched in regulatory law.” (citations omitted)).
315
See Renn & Klinke, supra note 24, at 12, 14. Renn and Klinke also suggest without elaboration that “substitution” should be considered under conditions of data unavailability, which
they define as a form of uncertainty. Id. at 15.
316
Id. at 15.
317
Id.

22 NEV. L.J. 145

204

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1

helpful in dealing with data unavailability, complexity, and indeterminacy.318
And they can be used in combination to supplement one another.
To select the optimal set of mitigation measures, regulators ought to treat
selection of mitigation measures like the classic multi-criteria decision that it is.
Accordingly, they should draw upon well-established frameworks, methods, and
tools from the field of decision analysis.319 Multi-criteria decision-making involves selecting a course of action from a set of alternatives, based on how well
the alternatives perform across a set of important criteria.320 Anyone who has
purchased a car or a smart TV has faced a multi-criteria decision problem. (For
example, for the car, one may balance criteria such as purchase cost, reliability,
gas mileage, safety, and other things.) Even such everyday decisions can present
difficult trade-offs; for example, suppose one car excels on reliability but is quite
expensive, while a very affordable alternative has “so-so” reliability. Selecting
mitigation measures in a regulatory setting can be even more difficult with a
larger number of criteria to weigh, greater uncertainty regarding performance,
and higher stakes at the societal level.
Of course, the particular criteria relevant to evaluation of mitigation
measures will vary depending upon the applicable law and the preferences of the
regulator and stakeholders. But at a more general level, and assuming at least
some level of rationality in their decision-making process, there ought to be some
evaluative criteria against which the potential policy approaches are evaluated.321
Drawing upon the evaluative criteria that appear in the literature, Table 8 sets out
the types of criteria that are relevant to mitigation measure selection.322

318

See supra Section III.A.1, Section III.A.2.
A decision framework means the overall structure of the decision-making process—the
particular steps in a certain order. Timothy F. Malloy et al., Advancing Alternative Analysis:
Integration of Decision Science, 125 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 066001-1, 066001-3 (2017)
[hereinafter Malloy et al., Advancing Alternative Analysis]. Methods and tools are formal and
informal aids, rules, and techniques that guide or facilitate those particular steps. Id. See also
Malloy et al., Decisions, Science, and Values, supra note 293, at 2139 (“If one is cooking a
meal, for example, the recipe is the framework, sauteing is a method, and pans and spatulas
are tools.”).
320
VALERIE BELTON & THEODOR J. STEWART, MULTIPLE CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS: AN
INTEGRATED APPROACH 13–16 (2002).
321
Robert M. Friedman et al., Environmental Policy Instrument Choice: The Challenge of
Competing Goals, 10 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 327, 328 (2000); ELINOR OSTROM ET AL.,
INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES IN
PERSPECTIVE 111 (1993).
322
See Malloy, Principled Prevention, supra note 12, at 166–68; Peter Bohm & Clifford S.
Russell, Comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments, in 1 HANDBOOK OF NATURAL
RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS 395, 399–402 (Allen V. Kneese & James L. Sweeney
eds., 1985); U.S. CONGRESS, OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A
USER’S GUIDE 50–53 (1995).
319
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TABLE 8: MITIGATION MEASURE EVALUATION CRITERIA
Effectiveness/ Protectiveness

Cost-Effectiveness
Dynamic Efficiency
Social Efficiency
Social Equity
Ease of Monitoring/
Enforcement
Adaptability
Individual Autonomy
Economic Autonomy
Institutional Capacity

The extent to which the measure is expected to achieve
and maintain the regulatory goal/standard: for example, reduction of unreasonable risk or protection of human health
and the environment.323 This includes the reliability of the
measure; that is, how prone it is to technology failure or
operator error.324
The cost of achieving a specified regulatory goal/standard,
measured at the societal level and at the regulated entity
level.325
The capacity of the measure to encourage innovation and
the diffusion of new technology.326
The extent to which the measure optimizes net social benefits.327
The extent to which the measure enhances equitable distribution of risks and benefits and advances meaningful participation in decision-making.328
The difficulty in monitoring and measuring compliance
and engaging in sufficient enforcement.329
The capacity of the measure to be revised to adjust to
changed circumstance or new information.330
The extent to which a regulatory approach restricts or enhances the choices available to the individual, including
choices that may cause the individual injury.331
The extent to which the measure constrains the regulated
entity’s capacity to order its operations and make economic decisions without interference.332
The capacity of the regulated entity and/or the regulatory
agency to effectively implement the measure, considering
the entity or agency’s skills, resources, and information
sources.333

Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) can help regulators sort through
this messy decision environment. MCDA is not a single method or approach.
Instead, it is a family of methods and tools designed to facilitate this type of
323

Friedman et al., supra note 321, at 345–47.
Malloy, Principled Prevention, supra note 12, at 168.
325
Id. at 170–71; Friedman et al., supra note 321, at 354–56.
326
Malloy, Principled Prevention, supra note 12, at 173; Friedman et al., supra note 321, at
365–67; Bohm & Russell, supra note 322, at 400–01.
327
Malloy, Principled Prevention, supra note 12, at 176–77; Bohm & Russell, supra note
322, at 399.
328
Friedman et al., supra note 321, at 351–53.
329
Id. at 346; Bohm & Russell, supra note 322, at 400.
330
Friedman et al., supra note 321, at 364–65; Bohm & Russell, supra note 322, at 400.
331
Malloy, Principled Prevention, supra note 12, at 179.
332
Id. at 183–84.
333
Id. at 186–87; Friedman et al., supra note 321, at 358–61.
324
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decision-making in different contexts.334 Some forms of MCDA are qualitative
and simple to implement. Others are highly sophisticated, mathematically based
methodologies. The various methods and tools have distinctive theoretical bases
and address data uncertainty, the relative importance of decision criteria, an+d
other issues differently.335 That said, each MCDA approach essentially provides
a systematic, observable process for evaluating alternatives in which an alternative’s performance across the decision criteria is synthesized to generate a relative ranking.336 At the conceptual level, most MCDA methods include three basic
steps. In problem structuring, the decision-maker identifies the relevant alternatives, the criteria by which they are to be judged, and the metrics used to measure
performance on each criterion. In model building, each alternative is assessed to
determine how well it performs on each criterion, and the criteria are weighted
to indicate their relative importance to the decision-maker. In model application,
the alternatives’ respective performance on the criteria and criteria weights are
used to rank each alternative relative to the other alternatives.337 Importantly, the
MCDA output is not “the decision”; it simply assists the decision-maker and
interested stakeholders in understanding the alternatives and trade-offs.338
The National Academy of Science has embraced the use of MCDA in regulatory decision making,339 as have scholars.340 Potential benefits of MCDA include greater transparency, facilitation of stakeholder engagement, more systematic consideration of disparate quantitative and qualitative criteria, and greater
understanding of the trade-offs presented by the decision problem.341 Yet MCDA
334

BELTON & STEWART, supra note 320, at 2.
See IGOR LINKOV & EMILY MOBERG, MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS:
ENVIRONMENTAL APPLICATIONS AND CASE STUDIES 4–7 (2012) (providing a brief overview of
three types of MCDA—multi-attribute utility theory, analytical hierarchy process, and outranking); BELTON & STEWART, supra note 320, at 119–260 (describing several MCDA methods in detail).
336
Malloy et al., Decisions, Science, and Values, supra note 293, at 2142.
337
See LINKOV & MOBERG, supra note 335, at 4 (problem identification and structuring,
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approaches can be technically demanding and resource intensive, requiring skill
sets not currently common within many regulatory agencies. And the breadth of
MCDA methods available can make selection of the appropriate tool challenging.342 From a more cynical perspective, some policymakers concerned about
constraining their own professional or political discretion may be reluctant to
employ MCDA.343 For these and other reasons, while some regulatory agencies
in the United States and Europe have begun to employ MCDA, regular use is
spotty.344 Meaningful incorporation of prevention and resilience into risk analysis will require adoption of some form of rigorous, structured decision making.
4. Implementation
Adoption of a resilience perspective calls for, among other things, the capacity to adapt to changing conditions. In light of this imperative, the implementation element of risk analysis must explicitly incorporate active monitoring and
adaptation. The notion that risk analysis, broadly defined, should include postimplementation monitoring, evaluation, and revision is hardly new. Some
twenty-five years ago, the Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management observed that “[e]valuation is critical to accountability and to ensure wise use of scarce resources. Too often, past risk management actions have had little or no evaluation or follow-up after
implementation . . . .”345 It is easy enough to agree that we ought to evaluate how
our mitigation measures are working and revise them as necessary. But what
does that look like on the ground? The answer depends in large part on the particular context; there are many tools and methods for monitoring and evaluation
available for varied settings. We return to the industrial safety and pesticide case
studies to sample two “shovel-ready” approaches not currently in wide use.
Conventional risk assessment and mitigation in the industrial safety setting
tends to be static. Facilities collect and analyze data regarding a process at a single moment in time, essentially assuming that the process operates unchanged
until the next round of regular assessment.346 But assumptions about the current
status of the process or efficacy of mitigation options may be flawed. And the
process and its associated risk mitigation systems degrade over time.347 Dynamic
342
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risk assessment and management (DRA) is an emerging approach that monitors
ongoing performance of the industrial process and the risk mitigation
measures.348 It “updates estimated risk of a deteriorating process according to the
performance of the control system, safety barriers, inspection and maintenance
activities, the human factor, and procedures.”349
Identification of particular DRA-based approaches for ongoing monitoring
and evaluation of risk mitigation is beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth
noting, however, that numerous such approaches exist, differing in (among other
things) the data used to monitor changing conditions350 and the methods used to
update risk estimates and mitigation options. Many DRA approaches focus upon
accident precursor data and alarm databases to monitor and reassess risk.351 Data
regarding ongoing operations can then be used iteratively in conventional risk
analysis methods, such as bow-tie analysis,352 and other methods, such as Bayesian analysis, principal component analysis, or risk barometers.353 In this way,
risk estimates and mitigation measures update risk estimates and mitigation
measures based upon actual operating conditions.354
Dynamic risk assessment illustrates monitoring and adaptation in a management-based regulatory scheme. The regulated entity itself is engaging in risk
analysis—including monitoring and adaptation—at the operational level. Monitoring and adaptation are also important functional components of implementation by regulatory agencies. The pesticide registration case is illustrative. As described in Section I.B.1, California’s Department of Pesticide Regulation runs a
robust pre-market registration program for pesticides, identifying and enforcing
mitigation standards for the use of hazardous pesticides.355 Mitigation standards
include use of personal protective equipment for workers applying the pesticides,
buffer zones to protect residents of adjacent property, and required application
348

Id.
Id. at 10.
350
Id. at 11–13.
351
Id. An “accident precursor” is an abnormal event that could have—but did not—result in
death or substantial property damage, often called a “near miss.” Nima Khakzad et al., On the
Application of Near Accident Data to Risk Analysis of Major Accidents, 126 RELIABILITY
ENG’G AND SYS. SAFETY 116, 116 (2014). “Alarm data” is data regarding specified events that
caused the process to vary from expected operating parameters. Warren D. Seider et al., Introduction to Dynamic Risk Analyses, in METHODS IN CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY, supra note 59,
at 201, 202–03.
352
Nima Khakzad et al., Dynamic Risk Analysis Using Bow-Tie Approach, 104 RELIABILITY
ENG’G AND SYS. SAFETY 36, 37 (2012).
353
Khan et al. supra note 347, at 12.
354
Requiring incorporation of resilience engineering concepts into facility safety processes
would also enhance systematic monitoring and evaluation of risk assessment and management.
Like dynamic risk assessment, resilience engineering acknowledges that an industrial facility
is subject to constant, sometimes unexpected changes that affect safety. Dynamic risk assessment focuses on continuous evaluation of discrete processes. Resilience engineering instead
focuses more broadly on the organization as a whole and on building the sensing and learning
capacity of individuals.
355
See supra, Section I.B.1.
349

22 NEV. L.J. 145

Fall 2021]

RE-IMAGINING RISK

209

methods, among other things. Yet such mitigation standards are typically based
on modeling and other predictive methods and tools. How do the agency and
stakeholders know whether the assumptions and predictions made as part of the
risk analysis process hold up on the ground over time?
DPR has several vehicles for monitoring and reevaluation of registered pesticides. The agency conducts exposure monitoring studies to assess pesticide exposure patterns and the effectiveness of existing controls.356 However, the frequency and focus of such monitoring activities are ad hoc; such monitoring is
not typically linked to or required as part of any specific registration. Two other
features of the California pesticide program provide for somewhat more systematic monitoring and adaptation. First, registrants are under a continuing obligation to report to DPR any information the registrant receives or generates regarding adverse effects associated with the product.357 Second, under certain
conditions, DPR must reevaluate registered products: for example, where adverse effects reporting or air monitoring indicate that a registered pesticide may
cause a significant adverse impact.358 During reevaluation, DPR reviews existing
data as well as new data required as part of the reevaluation process.359 Depending upon the outcome of its analysis, DPR may impose additional mitigation
measures or suspend or cancel the registration.360 Overall, DPR’s monitoring and
adaptation approach is a bit reactive; the monitoring is not systematic and the
standards triggering reevaluation are vague. But it does stand as a well-established effort to build resilience into the implementation element of risk analysis.
CONCLUSION
Risk analysis can trace its beginnings to the practices of the Asipu, a priestlike group living in the Tigris-Euphrates valley around 3200 B.C.361 Members of
the Asipu provided advice to individuals considering risky undertakings by analyzing alternatives using a simple ledger system, visualizing pros and cons, and
356
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submitting reports on clay tablets.362 The practice of risk analysis has evolved
over the last 5000 years, taking advantage of theoretical and methodological advances in probability theory and other related fields.363 In the last fifty years,
conventional risk analysis has come to play a central role in decision making by
regulators and private parties.364 But it must continue to change with the times,
responding to a broader range of risks and embracing advances in disciplines
such as complexity theory and decision analysis. And it must confront its own
limitations—incomplete data, complexity and ignorance, and indeterminacy.
The principles of prevention and resilience offer a means of surmounting
those limitations. While isolated applications of the prevention and resilience
principles exist, risk analysis practice has yet to systematically incorporate these
principles. This Article makes the case for integration and lays out a path forward, recognizing that taking prevention and resilience seriously will require
fundamental changes to the architecture of risk analysis. Some of the most pressing challenges are methodological, including developing and implementing more
comprehensive vulnerability assessment and comparative assessment methods
and crafting rigorous, but practical, multi-criteria decision analysis tools. Much
promising work in these areas is already underway; drawing upon that work can
expediate this next step in the evolution of risk analysis.
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